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INTRODUCTION 
Immediately following President Obama’s nomination of then-Judge 
Sonia Sotomayor to replace Justice Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court, crit-
ics branded her a “judicial activist”1 who would work without regard to the 
“rule of law.”2  Former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay contended that 
President Obama “couldn’t have appointed a more activist judge” and that 
Sotomayor’s activism made her unqualified for a seat on the Court.3  Karl 
Rove said the Republicans could win the battle against Sotomayor by “mak-
ing a clear case against the judicial activism she represents.”4  On the first 
day of Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings, Senator Jeff Sessions, the rank-
ing Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, proclaimed her to be an 
“activist judge that threatens the traditional foundation of the U.S. legal sys-
tem.”5  As has been typical in most political discussions about judges, the 
evidence supporting these assertions was notably lacking.6 
The debates about then-Judge Sotomayor and other nominees to the 
U.S. Supreme Court beg the question: how can it be said with any confi-
dence that a judge is or is not a judicial activist?  Unfortunately, empirical 
legal scholarship has been unable to offer a meaningful, statistically valid 
answer for judges on the U.S. courts of appeals.7  The study presented in 
this Article offers the first systematic attempt to determine the relative judi-
cial activism levels of Sotomayor and the other judges who served on the 
federal courts of appeals in 2008.  This study did so by measuring the latent 
trait underlying judicial activism: the propensity to privilege judgment.  
When a federal judge elevated his or her judgment above that of another 
constitutionally significant actor (e.g., Congress, the President, other Article 
III courts), then he or she was engaging in activity indicative of judicial ac-
tivism, regardless of the particular definition used.  Whether judicial activ-
ism was defined as failing to adhere to precedent, striking down legislation, 
or deviating from an accepted interpretative method, the activism involved 
 
1  Between May 26, 2009, the day then-Judge Sotomayor was nominated to join the Court, and May 
29, 2009, LexisNexis indicates there were 309 items using the term “judicial activism” or variations the-
reof in articles about then-Judge Sotomayor.  The relevant search used the “News, All (English, Full 
Text)” database and the terms “Sotomayor and judicial activis!”. 
2  See Robert Barnes, Battle Lines Are Drawn on Sotomayor Nomination, WASH. TIMES, May 28, 
2009, at A1.  
3  White House Responds as GOP Continues Sotomayor Attacks, CNN (May 29, 2009, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/29/sotomayor.white.house/index.html. 
4  Karl Rove, “Empathy” Is Code for Judicial Activism, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A13.  
5  Sotomayor Pledges “Fidelity to the Law,” CNN (July 13, 2009, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/13/sotomayor.hearing/index.html.  Not content with pedestrian 
labels, Curt Levey, the Executive Director of the Committee for Justice, called then-Judge Sotomayor a 
“wild-eyed judicial activist” even while he admitted that her record on the bench probably would not 
support that contention.  Barnes, supra note 2. 
6  See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
7  For details on the rough analyses of Justice Sotomayor’s “judicial activism” that were performed 
in the wake of her nomination, see infra note 176. 
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was premised on a judge putting his or her judgment in the place of others’.  
Instead of continuing the possibly endless debate about the meaning of 
judicial activism, the study outlined in this Article simply measured the trait 
that has been associated with the various forms of activism by examining 
the rate at which judges privileged their own views over those of others.  
The measure examined situations in which one might have expected an 
appellate judge to be more deferential to another constitutionally significant 
actor (in this case, a federal district court) as well as situations in which an 
appellate judge was less likely to defer.  By examining how individual 
judges respected both deferential and nondeferential standards of review in 
the aggregate, the study was able to determine the rate, relative to other 
judges, at which a judge substituted her judgment for that of a district court 
judge.  This study diverged from previous empirical accounts of the concept 
that have been applied to other court levels in three significant respects. 
First, while almost all major empirical work on judicial activism has 
focused on the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, this study targeted the 
judges on the federal courts of appeals.  Although the actions of the Su-
preme Court are higher profile,8 studying the courts of appeals for activism 
has been substantially more informative about judges and the judiciary.9  
Professors Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist succinctly stated the need to 
prioritize the study of the courts of appeals: “[T]he circuit court judiciary is 
probably the single most important level of the federal judiciary in light of 
its extensive caseload and policy making authority.”10  Further, in an era 
where the common path for someone to become a Supreme Court Justice 
involves first serving on the courts of appeals—as every current Justice ex-
cept Elena Kagan has done—studying that level can yield important objec-
tive information for the nomination process.11 
Second, by focusing on the common trait underlying most definitions 
of judicial activism, this empirical study used a broader measure to gauge 
activism, one that was not limited to instances of interbranch and intergov-
 
8  See ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1 
(2001) (“The Courts of Appeals are virtually invisible to most Americans. . . .  They receive little media 
coverage because their decisions are often less dramatic than the pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court . . . .”). 
9  Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Under-
stand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1904 (2009) (explaining 
that, among the federal courts, the courts of appeals are better to study because “[t]he courts of ap-
peals . . . hear far more cases each year than does the Supreme Court, have only very limited control 
over their dockets, and normally sit in panels of three (not en banc)”). 
10  Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1385 (2009); see 
also FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1–2 (2007) (“[T]he circuit 
courts are much more important [than the U.S. Supreme Court] in setting and enforcing the law of the 
United States.”); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2002) 
(“The truth, well known but often overlooked in the media and even in serious scholarship, is that lower 
court judges play a major role in the development of legal doctrine.”). 
11  See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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ernmental relations.  Most scholars have sought to measure activism 
through judicial review of federal legislation,12 executive agency deci-
sions,13 and state and local laws.14  Those measures only account for a very 
small portion of judicial decisions, particularly from federal courts below 
the Supreme Court.  Indeed, as Figure 1 illustrates, there were very few in-
stances when a federal appellate judge struck down legislation or reversed 
an agency decision in the 2008 cases studied. 
FIGURE 1: INTERBRANCH REVIEW IN DATASET 
 
As the above figure indicates, based upon the data studied in this Article, 
only 0.3% of federal appellate panels (31 of 10,242) voted to strike down 
federal legislation.  While reversals of agency decisions were more com-
mon (representing 1.2% of the studied cases), a large majority of those in-
stances were not in areas of law normally associated with judicial activism.  
Indeed, of the 122 times that a federal appellate court reversed an executive 
agency determination, 67 (54.9%) were Social Security cases.  In more po-
litically charged areas, only 5 of the 122 reversals (4.1%) involved labor re-
lations, 4 (3.3%) were related to environmental protection, and 3 (2.5%) 
were civil rights cases.  Consequently, most of the judges studied neither 
 
12  STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 47–64 (2009); Lo-
ri A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Nat-
ural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 66 (2007) (“‘Judicial activism’ is, and is likely to remain, a 
deeply contested term.  This paper has attempted to give the term some quantifiable meaning by defin-
ing it in three objectively verifiable ways: a justice’s willingness to invalidate federal legislation, to in-
validate state legislation, and to overturn precedent.”). 
13  LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 85–103. 
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voted to strike down federal legislation nor reversed an executive agency 
decision in a coded area commonly connected with judicial activism.  The 
great body of decisionmaking by the courts of appeals has been derived 
from review of lower courts, with little or no regard to the other branches of 
government.  Thus, to better understand activism and activism’s antithesis, 
restraint,15 at the federal appellate level, it was much more informative to 
evaluate the cases that compose the full range of judicial opinions.16 
Third, this study was concerned with identifying the overall behavior 
of judges and did not focus on individual instances of judicial activism.  Ra-
ther than determining whether particular decisions were examples of judi-
cial activism, this study attempted to locate the aggregate of behaviors 
associated with activism.  Whereas existing studies have used individual 
judicial votes as the unit of measure,17 which requires labeling each vote as 
“activist” or “restrained,” this study did not require such subjective and 
controversial coding.  Instead, the behavior of activism was measured in the 
aggregate using individual judges as the unit of measure. 
Using the measure articulated herein, this Article empirically studied 
whether activism was correlated with the political party of the President, the 
identity of the appointing President, the ideology of the judge, the political 
composition of the Senate, and the scenario of the President and the Senate 
majority being of the same party at the time of judicial appointment.  Ulti-
mately, this Article concludes that there is no evidence of a statistically sig-
nificant correlation between the activism of judges and their ideology 
(regardless of how activism was measured).  However, the study did find 
that the courts of appeals vary substantially in their levels of judicial activ-
ism in a statistically significant manner.  Further, in discussing the validity 
of the study, this Article provides insight into the judicial activism measures 
of four notable judges: Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, Justice Sonia 
 
15  Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1752, 1753 (2007) (“Activism was often juxtaposed against a policy of ‘judicial restraint’. . . .”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1401, 1401 (2002) (“[Judicial activism] began life as the antithesis of ‘judicial restraint’ . . . .”); Robert 
Justin Lipkin, We Are All Judicial Activists Now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 194 (2008) (“Wherever the 
concept of judicial activism lurks, the complementary idea of judicial restraint is also hiding.  These 
concepts are two sides of the same proverbial coin.”); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Real-
ism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 179 (1987) 
(noting that “judicial activism” is the opposite of “judicial self-restraint”); J. Clifford Wallace, The Juri-
sprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981) (“The 
opposite of judicial activism, judicial restraint has sometimes been referred to as ‘strict constructionism’ 
or ‘interpretivism.’”), reprinted in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 174 (David M. 
O’Brien ed., 3d ed. 2009). 
16  The population studied includes cases involving reviews of legislation and agency decisions be-
cause the courts of appeals in those cases must consider the district courts’ review of the statutes and 
agency actions. 
17  See, e.g., Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1773–74; Ringhand, supra note 12, at 44. 
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Sotomayor (during her time on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals), and 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III. 
Part I of this Article focuses on differing theoretical conceptions of 
judicial activism.  Part II reviews existing empirical studies of judicial ac-
tivism and introduces in detail the measure used in this study.  Part III ap-
plies this measure to a newly created dataset of 2008 opinions by eleven 
courts of appeals and analyzes the results based upon that application.  Part 
IV considers the reliability, validity, and limitations of the study while dis-
cussing the application of the measure to four notable judges on the courts 
of appeals.  The Article concludes with some thoughts about judicial activ-
ism and new directions for research.  Consistent with the mission of making 
empirical legal studies more accessible and understandable to a larger au-
dience,18 this Article avoids empirical research jargon whenever possible 
and utilizes graphical representation19 of key measures throughout.  The 
technical details traditionally found in empirical legal studies are largely lo-
cated in the footnotes and in the Appendices at the end of the Article. 
I. WHAT IS “JUDICIAL ACTIVISM”? 
The term “judicial activist” first appeared in print in a 1947 article in 
Fortune by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. about Justices on the Supreme Court.20  
Schlesinger targeted Justices Douglas and Black as being especially activ-
ist.21  In his extensive discussion of “activism” and “restraint,” Schlesinger 
offered no clear definition of either concept.22  Despite its ambiguity, once 
 
18  See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication 
of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2006) (“Most crucially, it 
seems nearly incontrovertible that moving towards more appropriate and accessible presentations of data 
will heighten the impact of empirical legal scholarship on its intended audience—be that audience other 
academics, students, policy makers, lawyers, or judges—not to mention raise the level of intellectual 
discourse among scholars themselves.”); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideolo-
gy, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 135–36 (2009) (“[I]t is incumbent 
upon those of us who investigate judicial ideology to employ concepts and methods that are both clear 
and appropriate.  The fact that much of the audience is not methodologically sophisticated makes it all 
the more crucial that we do so.  As a research community, we must cultivate and convey a better under-
standing of methods for measuring judicial ideology if we are to succeed in convincing others of the va-
lidity of our work.”). 
19  Cf. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective Communication of the 
Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801, 804–05 (2007) (“[R]esearchers should al-
most always graph their data and results. . . .  Unless the author has a very compelling reason to provide 
precise numbers to readers, a well-designed graph is a superior choice to a table.”). 
20  Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 73, 74–76.  The ar-
ticle also labeled Justices Murphy and Rutledge as “activist.”  Id. at 75–76.  For an extensive and helpful 
discussion of Schlesinger’s role in coining the term and the arguments he made, see Craig Green, An 
Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1200–09 (2009).  Notably, even before 
the term was first used, the idea of an activist judge had been understood in principle in debates about 
the judiciary throughout American history.  See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
21  Green, supra note 20, at 1203. 
22  See id. 
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the term “judicial activism” had been coined, it joined the lexicon of public 
and scholarly debates about the role of the judiciary.23 
From that time forward, the label “judicial activism” was used in a va-
riety of ways, often losing meaning with each new deployment.24  Judge Jo-
seph C. Hutcheson Jr. first used the phrase in a 1959 judicial opinion.25  
Since then, it has become increasingly common in opinions criticizing other 
judges.26  Although some scholars have defended activism by judges in a 
general sense,27 the term normally has been overwhelmingly loaded with 
negative connotations.28  Whereas judicial activism was historically a label 
hurled at liberal judges, it has more recently been an equal-opportunity epi-
thet launched at conservatives.29  The term “activism” has been so ubiquit-
ous in legal debates that its utterance has become an important part of the 
inevitable ritual of attacking a judge or a judicial decision.30  Notably, critics 
of nominees have offered nothing even resembling empirical evidence to 
support the use of the label “activist.”31  
The responses to the nomination of Justice Sotomayor discussed in the 
Introduction are representative of arguments about the judiciary from all 
 
23  See id. at 1207 (“History is as history does, however; and despite activism’s spare introduction, 
the term sprang to immediate use at the highest levels of legal debate.”). 
24  See Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2004) (“[A]s the term has become more commonplace, its meaning has 
become increasingly unclear.”). 
25  See Theriot v. Mercer, 262 F.2d 754, 760 n.5 (5th Cir. 1959); Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1455–56 
(noting that this was the first use of the term in an opinion). 
26  See Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 
74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 579 (2007); Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1442–43. 
27  See, e.g., STERLING HARWOOD, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE (2d ed. 1996); 
FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE OF THE WARREN COURT 
LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE (1999). 
28  See Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1444. 
29  LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 8 (“With the ascent of a conservative Supreme Court, ac-
cusations that conservatives are the ‘real judicial activists’ have become frequent . . . .” (citation omit-
ted)); Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1757 (“In today’s world, however, the tables have turned as 
‘[a]ccusations that conservatives on the Rehnquist Court are the real judicial activists have become 
commonplace.’” (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Upholding the Law, LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 31, 31)); 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 
1383–84 (2002) (discussing this shift and cataloging instances in which the Rehnquist Court was labeled 
as “activist”); Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Ori-
ginalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)) (“The odd thing is that—unlike any earlier 
time in American history—both sides of the political spectrum proclaim themselves unhappy with the 
courts.  Charges of judicial ‘activism,’ once a staple of conservative critiques of the courts, now are 
heard as often from liberals and progressives.”). 
30  See William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1–2 
(1992) (“In most cases, the mindless incantation of [judicial activism] amounts to a political ritual, 
which touches the congregation of voters on an emotional level without provoking any reasoned dis-
course among them.”). 
31  Id. 
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portions of the political spectrum.  Calling a nominee a “judicial activist” 
usually has meant no more than that the speaker opposes the appointment of 
that judge,32 and labeling a particular court ruling “activist” has most often 
been code for merely disliking the decision.33  Because of the difficulties 
involved in defining it, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook referred to “judicial 
activism” as “that notoriously slippery term.”34  Further, the ambiguity and 
overuse of the term has ensured that the concept has not been effectively 
measured and studied throughout the federal court system.35 
Despite the wide modern use of the pejorative label “activist,” its con-
tours are rarely defined by those deploying it.36  The use and abuse of the 
label extend beyond pundits and talking heads, as judges increasingly ac-
cuse their colleagues of activism.37  Upon examining the conventional use 
 
32  LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 14–17. 
33  See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 3 (2006) (“[I]n practice ‘activist’ turns out to be little more than a rhetorically 
charged shorthand for decisions the speaker disagrees with.”); Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1755 
(“In many cases, complaints about judicial activism only reflect an amorphous lament about disfavored 
Court decisions.”); David R. Dow, Cassandra Jeu & Anthony C. Coveny, Judicial Activism on the 
Rehnquist Court: An Empirical Assessment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 37 (2008) (“Rather 
than describing a particular mode of judicial analysis, the term ‘judicial activism’ refers to a judicial out-
come to which someone (namely the person using the term) generally objects.”); Justice, supra note 30, 
at 1 (“‘Judicial activism’ is, more often than not, a code word used to induce public disapproval of a 
court action that a politician opposes, but is powerless to overturn.”); William P. Marshall, Conserva-
tives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (2002) (“Judicial activism 
means a decision one does not like.”); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2002) (“[P]articipants in both academic and political debates generally 
use ‘judicial activism’ as a convenient shorthand for judicial decisions they do not like.”); see also Ker-
mit Roosevelt III & Richard W. Garnett, Debate, Judicial Activism and Its Critics, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 112, 112 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Roosevelt_Garnett.pdf (Roo-
sevelt, Opening Statement) (“The negative argument . . . is that ‘judicial activism,’ as the phrase is typi-
cally used, is essentially empty of content; it is simply an inflammatory way of registering disapproval 
of a decision.”). 
34  Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 1401. 
35  See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.  
36  The failure to offer any meaningful definition of “judicial activist” while branding a judge with 
the label is a common phenomenon in public debate.  See, e.g., Justice, supra note 30, at 2 (“Even within 
the legal profession, defenders and decriers of ‘judicial activism’ sometimes fail to see the need to ex-
plain just what it is they are debating.”); Young, supra note 33, at 1143 (“Debates about the law fre-
quently involve charges of ‘judicial activism,’ but those charges are rarely accompanied by an attempt to 
define the term with any sort of precision.”); Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1443 (“‘[J]udicial activism’ is 
defined in a number of disparate, even contradictory, ways; scholars and judges recognize this problem, 
yet persist in speaking about the concept without defining it.”). 
37  Roberts, supra note 26, at 579 (“The phrase appears often in dissenting opinions, and in some 
cases is used to arouse intrigue or accusation, as it is often used by the media.”); Kmiec, supra note 24, 
at 1442–43 (“Judges today are far more likely to accuse their colleagues of judicial activism than they 
were in prior decades.”). 
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of the term, one might conclude that it is “empty”38 and unworthy of further 
inquiry.39  However, this Article contends that judicial activism is an idea 
worth salvaging in order to better understand judicial behavior40 and to de-
bate the merits of particular judicial nominees.41  
As Ernest Young explained, “‘Activism’ is a helpful category in that it 
focuses attention on the judiciary’s institutional role rather than the merits 
of particular decisions.”42  Activism goes to essential questions about the 
role of the judge in our democratic order.43  Confirmation hearings, public 
debates about judicial decisions, and scholarly discussions of the institu-
tional role of members of the judiciary all present situations in which the 
concept of activism will and must be discussed.44  While “activism” has be-
come trivialized by overuse, it still describes judges who are more apt to 
elevate their judgment above others’.  Understanding which judges more 
regularly exhibit the fundamental trait underlying activism can lend tre-
 
38  Roosevelt & Garnett, supra note 33, at 3–4 (Roosevelt, Opening Argument); see Randy E. Bar-
nett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court? The Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1275, 1275–76 (2002); Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 1401. 
39  Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 493 (2007) (contending that 
the term “activism” is essentially meaningless); Dow, Jeu & Coveny, supra note 33, at 38 (“Because the 
phrase ‘judicial activism’ means nothing, it cannot be coherently described, and because it cannot be 
coherently described, it cannot be measured empirically.”); Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1716 (2007) (“The phrase ‘judicial activism’ is . . . meaningless because it 
offers little more than reflexive criticism and convenient sound bites.”); Charlie Savage, Uncertain Evi-
dence for “Activist” Label on Sotomayor, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A10 (quoting Professor Ri-
chard Epstein as saying, “‘Judicial activism’ tells you nothing . . . .  The term ought to be scrapped.  In 
today’s world it’s just a synonym for bad decisions.  O.K., I’m against bad decisions, too.  But you al-
ways have to explain why, and there’s no shortcut for doing that.”). 
40  See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 29 (“Yet claims of judicial activism need not be mea-
ningless.  One can clearly imagine relatively more or less activist judiciaries that play a greater or lesser 
role in national governance.”); Green, supra note 20, at 1198 (“When understood properly, debates over 
judicial activism are a vital part of public life, and they also represent the legal academy’s highest call-
ing.”); Young, supra note 33, at 1216 (“[B]y being more precise about both ‘conservatism’ and ‘judicial 
activism,’ we can recover meanings that helpfully advance our present constitutional debates.”). 
41  Young, supra note 33, at 1140. 
42  Id. at 1141. 
43  See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 30 (“Nevertheless, the simple fact that a term is mi-
sused or only used vaguely does not mean that it lacks intrinsic meaning or value.  ‘Judicial activism’ 
captures an important aspect of modern governance.”); see also Green, supra note 20, at 1225 (stressing 
the value of discussions about judicial activism in causing otherwise unchecked judges to be aware of 
their own “judicial usurpation”). 
44  See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 14–17; see also Green, supra note 20, at 
126162 (“The extent to which judicial standards should derive from public attitudes, rather than those 
of legal experts, may be debatable.  But to ignore social attitudes over mere issues of rhetoric seems un-
sound.  In a democracy with public confirmation hearings, it may be important for scholars to under-
stand and perhaps even reform the language of ‘activism’ if their views are to carry full weight.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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mendous insight into judicial behavior in general.45  Further, the concept’s 
public descent into meaninglessness will not simply cause it to disappear.46  
Rather, it will continue to be part of essential rhetoric surrounding every 
discussion about the judiciary.  Therefore, identifying useful and effective 
measures to gauge activism may at least add a modicum of clarity to the 
confusion concerning the topic. 
Scholars have offered an incredible list of possible components and de-
finitions of judicial activism.  Rather than discussing each of the possible 
definitions or aspects in detail, it is more practical to simply list the essen-
tial elements of these various perspectives.  From those perspectives and 
definitions, the following elements emerge as signs of judicial activism: 
overruling actions by other federal branches or state governments, failing to 
follow textual meaning, departing from history or tradition, issuing max-
imalist and not minimalist holdings, using broad remedial powers, basing 
decisions upon partisan preferences, failing to follow an originalist view of 
the Constitution, issuing an opinion inconsistent with prior precedent, exer-
cising power beyond a court’s jurisdiction, creating new rights or theories, 
altering prior doctrines or interpretations, establishing substantive policy, 
and failing to use an accepted interpretative methodology.47  
Perhaps the clearest conclusion one can draw from the various attempts 
to understand and define judicial activism is that the concept of judicial ac-
tivism is “multidimensional.”48  As such, it makes little sense to define “ac-
tivism” and “restraint” as part of a binary construction.  Instead, the terms 
are best understood as endpoints on a continuum describing one aspect of 
judicial behavior.49  Of particular importance to this Article is the realization 
that activism does not have to be inherently good or bad; it can simply be a 
 
45  Cf. Green, supra note 20, at 1221 (“[A]ctivism debates are indispensable, and this conceptual 
point remains true regardless of whether one prefers ‘judicial legislation,’ ‘aggressive judging,’ or some 
other rhetorical creature.  The concept of judicial activism underlies them all.” (footnote omitted)). 
46  Cf. id. at 1220 (“On the other hand, an academic choice to decry or ignore activism-talk will not 
make the term disappear.”). 
47  See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 32; Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 
176263 (paraphrasing Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 
66 JUDICATURE 236, 239 (1983)); Green, supra note 20, at 1217; Marshall, supra note 33, at 1220; 
Young, supra note 33, at 1144; Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1463–76. 
Notably, the authors of the various lists of signs readily concede that the different definitions or in-
dices are often in tension with each other.  E.g., Marshall, supra note 33, at 1220 (noting that the indices 
offered are “not always consistent with each other”); Young, supra note 33, at 1164 (“Given the variety 
of forms that activism may take, it is not surprising that these definitions of activism will quickly come 
into conflict in particular cases.”); see also Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1443 (noting that “‘judicial activ-
ism’ is defined in a number of disparate, even contradictory, ways”).  
48  See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1763.  However, some scholars and judges have rejected 
“multidimensional” definitions in favor of a narrow definition focused entirely on interbranch actions.  
See infra Part II.A.  
49  LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 31 (“Thus activism is best conceptualized in terms of a 
continuum between activism and restraint, with justices or courts compared in terms of gradations along 
that continuum.”). 
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descriptive term for a certain type of judicial activity.50  Indeed, many out-
comes that were widely considered to be the product of judicial activism, 
such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,51 
have been treated kindly by commentators.52  Labeling a judge an “activist,” 
then, should not be construed as a pejorative but rather as an identification 
of a trait possessed by that judge.  Similarly, “judicial restraint” should be 
understood as a value-free term for identifying judicial activity that is more 
deferential.53  While “restraint” has been often used as a compliment, there 
are many historical instances, such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Ko-
rematsu v. United States,54 in which the Court’s restraint is now viewed 
with disdain.55  There will certainly be instances where one can argue credi-
bly that a particular judge was too activist or too restrained,56 but in order to 
have a meaningful discussion of the concepts, one must minimize the pejor-
ative connotations.57  Otherwise, scholarly debate about the subject will 
simply spiral into the same morass exhibited in public discussion.58 
The core of these varied concepts of judicial activism has been the idea 
that judges are activist when they substitute their judgment in place of that 
 
50  See Lipkin, supra note 15, at 203 (“Nothing in this distinction suggests that either form of judicial 
activism is good or bad.  It is a distinction that should be used as a filter through which to evaluate dif-
ferent proposals for defining judicial activism.” (footnote omitted)). 
51  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
52  See, e.g., Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1753. 
53  See Wallace, supra note 15, at 14 (arguing that judicial restraint requires a judge to “give proper 
deference”). 
54  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
55  See, e.g., Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1753. 
56  See Young, supra note 33, at 1163 (“Movement in a particular direction carries no normative 
weight unless we can explain why that movement has gone too far.”). 
57  See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 1405 (defending a redefinition of the concept that is “value-
free”); Young, supra note 33, at 1144 (“[J]udicial ‘activism’ is not just an epithet—or at least . . . it does 
not have to be.  Properly used, ‘activism’ and ‘restraint’ focus us on the institutional aspects of judicial 
decisions, apart from the merits, and this focus will be useful from time to time.”). 
58  This is not to say that healthy debate about the concept has not occurred.  Indeed, Professor Craig 
Green recently offered a simple definition of activism in response to the numerous alternatives that have 
been proposed: activism occurs when a judge “violate[s] cultural norms of judicial role.”  Green, supra 
note 20, at 1255.  Notably, in contrast to the author of this Article, Green considers activism to be a net 
negative characteristic for a judge, see id. at 1222, even as he acknowledges that activism could be used 
for positive ends, see id. at 1220–21.  Professor Ernest Young theorized perhaps the most complete defi-
nition of the concept for purposes of empirical study and effectively synthesized the various perspectives 
about the term: 
“[A]ctivist” [behaviors] in legal debates share a common thread, that is, the assertion of broad 
judicial decision making autonomy in relation to other actors in the system.  These actors may in-
clude the federal political branches, state governments, the framers and ratifiers of the Constitu-
tion, or other courts that have decided similar issues in the past or that may be called upon to do so 
in the future. 
Young, supra note 33, at 1143.  As Young himself noted, his definition avoided the “normative content” 
of the term “activism” except as part of a larger debate about the institutional role of the judiciary.  Id.  
Young’s and Green’s efforts together provide a solid starting point for redefining the concept with a par-
ticular eye toward empirical study. 
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of other significant actors.  When judges do not follow prior precedent, they 
are placing their judgment above that of prior courts.  When judges strike 
down legislation, they are similarly placing their judgment above that of 
legislators.  And when judges seek to achieve certain policy results regard-
less of doctrine, they put their judgment about what is “right” above what 
various other actors believe the law to be.  Each of the common perspec-
tives on activism can be understood as relying on specific examples of 
judges placing their judgment above that of others. 
However, every instance in which a judge places his or her judgment 
above another’s is not necessarily indicative of activism.  For example, 
when judges grant defense motions to suppress evidence in criminal cases, 
they place their judgment above that of a police officer.  However, because 
a police officer has never been a constitutionally significant actor, these 
judicial decisions have not been construed as “activist.”  Similarly, courts’ 
judgments often supplant those of litigants and their lawyers, but these de-
cisions have not been classified as “activist” or “restrained.”  In order to 
measure activism and the trait underlying it, it is only necessary to focus on 
the primary constitutionally significant actors: Congress, the Executive, 
state governments, and other courts.   
II. MEASURING THE ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT OF JUDGES 
Despite the incredibly wide use of the term “judicial activism,” there 
has been very little empirical examination of the concept.59  In part because 
of the difficulty in measuring ideas like “results-oriented judging,” there 
have been few attempts.  Perhaps the most significant difficulty in studying 
judicial activism has been that there often is no identifiable baseline to ex-
plain what a restrained judge would have done in a particular case.  Judge 
Diarmuid O’Scannlain explained: “[A researcher] must establish a non-
controversial benchmark by which to evaluate how far from the ‘correct’ 
decision the supposedly activist judge has strayed.”60  If every reversal of a 
lower court decision or striking down of a statute were considered “activ-
ist,” the term would lose relevance and meaning.  Even a restrained judge 
would be expected to have placed her judgment above others in many situa-
tions.  
Nonetheless, there have been certain aspects of judicial activism that 
have been measured by social scientists and legal scholars.61  Stefanie Lind-
quist and Frank Cross recently completed a very important study of the U.S. 
Supreme Court that was the first to combine five of the most common 
 
59  See, e.g., Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1770 (“To date, the empirical research exploring 
judicial activism has only scratched the surface.”). 
60  Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, On Judicial Activism, OPEN SPACES Q., Mar. 2000, at 20, 23, available 
at http://www.open-spaces.com/article-v3n1-oscannlain.php. 
61  See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 44–45. 
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measures of activism.62  The typical measures they combined examined 
when courts (1) struck down federal legislation, (2) struck down state and 
local laws, (3) reversed executive agency actions, (4) overruled prior 
precedent, and (5) expanded the jurisdiction of courts through justiciability 
decisions.63  However, as discussed in the Introduction, it has been difficult 
to apply a similar methodology to the lower courts because of the infre-
quency of those occurrences at those levels. 
A. Judicial Activism as Interbranch and Intergovernmental Action by the 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Many judges and scholars, consistent with existing empirical studies, 
have argued that focusing on actions against elected branches and govern-
ments should be the only way to measure judicial activism.  Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III wrote: “All manifestations of activism involve by definition 
judicial intervention into the democratic process.”64  Judge Richard Posner 
noted a similar limitation: “[U]nless [a] court is acting contrary to the will 
of the other branches of government, it is not being ‘activist’ in the sense 
[that] should . . . become canonical.”65  Cass Sunstein argued that “it is best 
to measure judicial activism by seeing how often a court strikes down the 
actions of other parts of government.”66  There are many shortcomings to 
measuring judicial activism so narrowly. 
First, such a measure would only apply to a small slice of the defini-
tions of activism.  Most of the scholarly, lay, media, political, and judicial 
conceptions of judicial activism have not required intergovernmental or in-
terbranch actions.  For example, the various popular views of judicial activ-
ism include failing to follow textual meaning, departing from history or 
tradition, issuing maximalist and not minimalist holdings, using broad re-
medial powers, basing decisions upon partisan preferences, failing to follow 
an originalist view of the Constitution, issuing an opinion inconsistent with 
prior precedent, exercising power beyond a court’s jurisdiction, creating 
new rights or theories, altering prior doctrines or interpretations, establish-
 
62  See id. 
63  See id. (comprehensively reviewing such measures). 
64  Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 1386. 
65  RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 320 (1996). 
66  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR 
AMERICA 42–43 (2005); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 45 (1990) (noting that courts decide on a case-by-case basis whether the Legis-
lature or the courts will govern); Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 1403–04 (“[U]nless the application of 
the Constitution or statute is so clear that it has the traditional qualities of law rather than political or 
moral philosophy, a judge should let democracy prevail.”); Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 
14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141, 143 (2002) (“[J]udicial activism is any occasion where a court intervenes 
and strikes down a piece of duly enacted legislation.”). 
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ing substantive policy, and failing to use an accepted interpretative metho-
dology.67   
Hypothetical interbranch and intergovernmental measures would dis-
count the public and scholarly debate over decisions frequently labeled as 
“activist.”  The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona68 has been 
criticized as embodying the judicial activism of the Warren Court.69  How-
ever, this archetypal decision in the judicial activism debate was attacked as 
activist because of the Court’s reasoning and not because the Court was re-
viewing legislation.  Even when judicial review of legislation has been in-
volved, the “activism” label has often been applied for reasons that have 
nothing to do with the interbranch aspect of the case.  For example, when 
the Ninth Circuit, which has become a favorite target for critics of judicial 
activism,70 held that the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance represented an unconstitutional establishment of religion,71 
the decision was not branded as “activist” because it struck down legislation 
or an executive action.  Instead, as critics like Senator Orrin Hatch pointed 
out, the Ninth Circuit’s results-driven decisionmaking and disregard for 
precedent were the basis for the “activism” label, even though the case in-
volved judicial review of legislation.72  
 
67  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
68  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
69  See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Ross Feldmann, Education and Interrogation: Com-
paring Brown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 344 (2005) (“The parallels between Brown and 
Miranda—and Furman, too—demonstrate both the bold judicial activism of the Warren Court era, as 
well as its ultimate failure to bring about real change in key areas of our society.”); Erik Luna, Constitu-
tional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125, 1161–62 (2000) (“As might be expected, the 
Court faced considerable heat from legal scholars of all political bents.  Joseph Grano, for one, criticized 
Miranda as an ultimate form of judicial activism without constitutional mandate . . . .” (footnote omit-
ted)); Edwin Meese III, Challenges Facing Our System of Justice, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 303, 312 
(2005) (“In the area of criminal prosecution, the Mapp and Miranda cases changed entirely the require-
ments imposed on the states to conform to a federal standard of criminal procedure that was not at the 
time required by the Constitution.  Indeed in the Miranda case, we have this judicial activism com-
pounded by subsequent judicial ‘boot-strapping.’” (footnotes omitted)); Book Note, The Eyes of the 
Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1390, 1390 (1990) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL (1988)) 
(“In addition to galvanizing academic opposition to judicial activism, Miranda roused popular criticism 
of the Court.”); Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1473 (explaining that Miranda has been seen as an example of 
judicial activism). 
70  See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. 4986 (2003) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski) (“The recent history 
of the 9th Circuit suggests a judicial activism that is close to the fringe of legal reasoning.”); 144 CONG. 
REC. 24457 (1998) (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (calling the Ninth Circuit “the epicenter of judicial 
activism in this country”); Press Report, Representative Trent Franks, Franks Denounces Ninth Circuit 
Ruling Against Parental Rights (Nov. 4, 2005) (“This is just the latest outrage to come from the Ninth 
Circuit, which has become the poster child for judicial activism.”), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
apps/list/press/az02_franks/110405_ParentalRights.html. 
71  See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002). 
72  See Orrin G. Hatch, Op-Ed., A Circuitous Court—Pledge Decision Is Judicial Activism, WASH. 
TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A17 (“[The Newdow decision] is . . . flatly inconsistent with a unanimous, dec-
ade-old ruling of the Seventh Circuit, Sherman vs. Community Consolidated School District, where the 
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There also have been many instances in which judges have usurped the 
roles of other branches of government without striking down legislation or 
other governmental acts.  For example, courts have created brand-new doc-
trine (an “activist” approach under modern conceptions of the term) to 
uphold a democratic action.73  Most often this has occurred when the Court 
has created a new doctrine that limits a constitutional right and thus allows 
legislation to survive scrutiny.  Examples of this so-called activist judicial 
restraint74 might include Plessy v. Ferguson75 and the Slaughter-House Cas-
es.76  In such instances, it would be very difficult for a study to classify such 
actions as “activist” or “restrained.”  Applying a measure that only counted 
interbranch reversals would, at a minimum, fail to measure these events and 
might also falsely signal restraint when a new doctrine upheld democratic 
action.  Further, the idea of a judge acting like a one-person legislature is 
interwoven with the concept of judicial activism.77  A judge, or panel of 
judges, can act as a legislature by establishing new policy.  An activism 
measure focused on interbranch relations thus would omit as nonactivist 
some of the cases most commonly called “activist.” 
Second, a definition of “activism” based only on interbranch activity is 
overinclusive.  There have been numerous occasions on which a judge has 
used judicial review to strike down legislation or overrule an agency that do 
not reflect any of the essential characteristics of the term “activist.”78  In-
deed, judicial review of the other branches has been and continues to be an 
                                                                                                                           
court held that ‘schools may lead the Pledge of Allegiance daily, so long as pupils are free not to partici-
pate.’  This is truly a remarkable feat of judicial activism . . . .”). 
73  Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1760 (“Moreover, activism is not limited solely to incidents 
in which the judiciary invalidates a statute; as Randy Barnett argues, ‘it is activist for courts to adopt 
doctrines that contradict the text of the Constitution either to uphold or nullify a law.’” (quoting Barnett, 
supra note 38, at 1276)). 
74  See Lipkin, supra note 15, at 213–14 (“Constitutional history supports the claim that maintaining 
the status quo, through judicial restraints can be just as activist as striking down legislation.  Three ex-
amples clearly illustrate the dangerous effect of ‘activist judicial restraint:’ the Slaughter-House Cases, 
Plessy v. Ferguson, and Korematsu v. United States.  In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court dealt a 
virtual death blow to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  By giving it quite a 
remarkable interpretation, the Court rewrote the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In its decidedly 
narrow interpretation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, the Court postponed 
for decades these constitutional provisions from assuming their rightful place in the American pantheon 
of individual rights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
75  163 U.S. 537, 548–52 (1896). 
76  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
77  See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1756. 
78  Id. at 1760 (“Exercise of the power of judicial review might be called ‘activist,’ but the mere ex-
ercise of the power alone is not what animates critics of activist decisions.  Should a state ignore the 
Thirteenth Amendment and reinstitute slavery, few would criticize the Court for striking down such leg-
islation, nor would such a ruling be deemed ‘activist.’” (footnote omitted)); Kmiec, supra note 24, at 
1463–64 (“Invalidation alone . . . reveals little about the propriety of individual decisions.  The mere fact 
that the Court has struck down more laws in recent years does not automatically render the individual 
decisions suspect.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 16 
essential function of modern courts.79  Not all (and possibly not even most) 
invalidations of laws or executive actions have been “activist” even by the 
standards of those who espouse intergovernmental and interbranch defini-
tions.  Notably, Justice Antonin Scalia, a well-noted voice against judicial 
activism,80 has remarked that striking down legislation is not inherently in-
dicative of activism in an era when “Congress is increasingly abdicating its 
independent responsibility to be sure that it is being faithful to the Constitu-
tion.”81  This problem makes identifying an adequate baseline for restraint 
using hypothetical interbranch measures all the more difficult. 
Third, such a limited view of activism necessarily relies on a subjective 
view of the proper role of courts.  All scholars and judges have agreed that 
the courts must strike down legislation on constitutional grounds in certain 
instances—the debate is largely about the degree to which that is desira-
ble.82  Any attempt to delineate instances of activism and restraint will in-
variably focus on subjective notions of the proper role of the judiciary.  
Consequently, the definitions of “activism” really obscure the subtextual 
fact that some rebukes of democratic institutions by the courts have not 
been activist.  The ability to differentiate between activist and restrained de-
cisions continues to sit at the heart of the definitional debate, yet the distinc-
tion would be overlooked by the focus on intergovernmental and 
interbranch actions in an empirical study of the courts of appeals.  Further, 
in order to exercise their proper constitutional role, courts must be willing 
to exercise judicial review of legislative or executive actions for constitu-
tionality.  
Fourth, even if such a measure of intergovernmental- and interbranch-
related decisions makes sense in regards to the Supreme Court, it has little 
applicability to the courts of appeals.  These courts have very rarely over-
ruled other branches.  As noted above, just a fraction of one percent of the 
 
79  Craig Green has effectively explained this problem for existing studies: 
 [T]he definition of “judicial activism” as any decision invalidating a statute is popular among 
quantitative empiricists, largely because such activity is easy to count. . . .  But there are two prob-
lems.  First, a focus on examples of judicial review fails to condemn judicial activism, because a 
key function of post-Marbury courts is to invalidate unconstitutional acts. . . .  Second, even empi-
ricists know that not every statutory invalidation is activist.  Yet without a more nuanced defini-
tion, no one can determine whether a few, many, or most judicial decisions striking down statutes 
are truly activist. 
 An example will illustrate both points: If Congress banned political sedition, or authorized the 
race-based punishment of American citizens, courts would not be “activist” in annulling such sta-
tutes.  And although quantitative studies often recognize this problem, they nonetheless accept sta-
tutory invalidation as an impressionistic proxy for activism.  In so doing, empirical accounts 
implicitly exchange all plausible definitions of judicial activism for a solid data set.  Although the 
quantitative study of judicial decisions invalidating statutes may be worthwhile in its own right, 
such analysis holds no adequate definition of activism. 
Green, supra note 20, at 1218–19 (footnotes omitted). 
80  See id. at 1249–50. 
81  Stuart Taylor Jr., The Tipping Point, NAT’L J., June 10, 2000, at 1810, 1811 (quoting Justice Sca-
lia). 
82  See Kmiec, supra note 24, at 1465–66. 
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cases in this study involved a court of appeals judge voting to strike down 
legislation.83  A narrow measure of activism based upon judicial review of 
legislation ultimately would suggest that a judge on a court of appeals was 
not an activist in 99.7% of her decisions.  Not only would this conclusion 
contradict many common understandings of the concept,84 but it would 
render the measure meaningless in understanding activism at the federal ap-
pellate level.  
Because of those shortcomings, it may be surprising that so many 
scholars have construed judicial activism so narrowly.  However, intergov-
ernmental and interbranch measures have been, in some ways, easier to use 
than some hypothetical ideal measures that identify the “restrained” out-
come in a case, so there is good reason for such a limited focus.  Further, at 
the U.S. Supreme Court level, at which existing studies have primarily 
aimed, the percentage of the docket that includes interbranch and intergov-
ernmental actions is far higher, so studies of those cases have yielded in-
sight into the overall performance of Justices.85 
Notably, though, the exclusive focus upon the Supreme Court at the 
federal level has skewed the picture of activism.  There are many aspects of 
the modern Supreme Court that make it atypical in terms of judicial activ-
ism.86  Primarily because of the ever-shrinking Supreme Court docket, it has 
been a less-than-ideal institution to study empirically.  Because the Court 
only reviews approximately seventy-five cases per year,87 the population 
sizes are very small (particularly using existing measures),88 coverage of 
different areas of law is minimal,89 and the self-selected docket does not 
necessarily provide a random sample of litigation in the United States.  The 
samples are even more complicated given the selection effects of the liti-
gants involved in Supreme Court litigation.90  Further, actions by Supreme 
 
83  See supra Figure 1. 
84  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
85  See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 12, at 50–51. 
86  Cf. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 9, at 1904 (“There are many empirical studies devoted to 
the decisions of the Supreme Court.  However, because of the Court’s unique status and operating pro-
cedures, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about decisionmaking in the federal courts of appeals 
from studies of the Supreme Court.”). 
87  CROSS, supra note 10, at 2. 
88  See id. 
89  See id.; Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court reviews only a minute percentage . . . of court 
of appeals decisions.  Entire fields of law are left mainly to the courts of appeals to shape.”). 
90  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 824 (1993) (ex-
plaining that “given the existing indeterminacy and moral reference of so much of the constitutional text, 
. . . the selection effect concentrates in the Supreme Court cases for which the narrowly legal materials 
do not generate an answer”); see also Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency 
Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1058 n.162 (2007) (“The drawing of conclusions based on this 
collection of Supreme Court cases is obviously fraught with peril, since the sample is heavily influenced 
by selection effects.  Only certain types of cases reach the Supreme Court (or are even litigated in the 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 18 
Court Justices are essentially unconstrained: Justices are free to vote in any 
manner based on any rationale, with very limited repercussions.91  It is, thus, 
very hard to construct a baseline of “restraint” against which to measure 
“activism” by Justices.  Also of significance is that when a person is ap-
pointed to the Court, she receives life tenure with almost no possibility of 
impeachment based upon judicial performance92 and has no chance of addi-
tional promotion to incentivize, and therefore constrain, her behavior.  That 
means that any information about a Justice’s activism cannot be used to ef-
fect change in the performance of the Court.  In contrast, the courts of ap-
peals continue to review an enormous number of cases from varied areas of 
law;93 are constrained by the Supreme Court, en banc review, and other 
panel decisions;94 and can be evaluated based upon performance before be-
ing elevated to the Supreme Court.95  This last characteristic of courts of ap-
peals judges is particularly notable given the increasing trend of selecting 
Supreme Court Justices from the federal appellate ranks (with the notable 
exception of Solicitor General Elena Kagan’s nomination).96 
B. Measuring the Substitution of Judgment 
The complexity of creating a viable measure of judicial activism is 
perhaps most typified by the baseline problem.  The lack of a baseline of 
judicial restraint against which to measure activism has made the creation 
of a measure of judicial activism for the courts of appeals judges nearly im-
possible.  Without a definitive foundation for comparison, attempts to 
measure judicial activism in a systematic manner have failed thus far.  
                                                                                                                           
first place), and unquestionably ambiguous and unambiguous statutes are likely filtered out at lower le-
vels of the process.”); Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
169, 173–74 & n.25 (2002) (“[C]ase-selection effects create difficulties for the design of empirical stu-
dies that seek to determine whether the votes of judges are influenced by their ideologies.”). 
91  Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 
1054 (2006) (“The Supreme Court is of course not a typical American court.  The federal courts of ap-
peals . . . have a more diverse and less political docket and are constrained by threat of reversal . . . .”). 
92  See, e.g., Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Estab-
lish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800 
(1986) (explaining that, under the Constitution, Justices enjoy life tenure and can only be removed by 
impeachment proceedings and pointing out that no Justice has ever been successfully impeached). 
93  See CROSS, supra note 10, at 2 (“[T]he circuit courts resolve more than fifty thousand cases a 
year.”). 
94  See Posner, supra note 91, at 1054; see also Savage, supra note 39 (paraphrasing M. Edward 
Whelan III as saying that “Supreme Court justices have a freer hand than appeals court judges”). 
95  See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 299, 303 (2004) 
(noting the “role that politics plays in both the initial process of selecting a candidate and the often high-
ly political Senate confirmation proceedings”).  
96  See id. (“The norm today appears to be that a candidate for the Supreme Court must first sit on a 
federal circuit court of appeals before she may be considered for a seat on the Court.”); Timothy P. 
O’Neill, “The Stepford Justices”: The Need for Experiential Diversity on the Roberts Court, 60 OKLA. 
L. REV. 701, 702 (2007) (pointing out that in 2007, “[f]or the first time in history[,] every justice had 
been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals at the time of appointment to the Supreme Court”). 
105:1  (2011) Flexing Judicial Muscle 
 19 
Regardless of a person’s particular conception of legal interpretation, 
formalism has provided a baseline for an empirical study through its strict 
application of the law.97  The formal model of law can be best understood in 
relation to the major competing theories describing judicial behavior: the 
attitudinal and strategic models.98  The attitudinal model, in its strongest 
form, contends that legal outcomes are determined by the policy prefe-
rences of judges.99  The strategic model describes judicial outcomes as dri-
ven by the institutional and personal goals of judges, such as appointment to 
the Supreme Court.100  Under both of those models, law itself is not a signif-
icant constraining force on judicial actions. 
In contrast, legal formalists have understood law as “a determinate set 
of rules distinct from political and social factors” that is applied by neutral 
judges.101  Formal application of the law is a value that judges believe de-
termines their decisions in many cases.  Interviews with federal appellate 
judges,102 as well as prior empirical studies,103 support this understanding of 
the formal model.  If it could effectively be gauged in an empirical study, 
the formal model could provide a neutral benchmark against which activism 
might be measured.  The degree to which a judge deviates from a formal 
model could help measure that judge’s activism level, at least in relation to 
other judges.  Thus, the essence of activism as it can be measured with an 
adequate formalism baseline may be defined as follows:  
Judges exhibit activism when they privilege their judgment over that of consti-
tutionally significant actors when the formal model would predict that they 
would defer to those actors.  
Standards of review might provide a means to measure what a formal 
model of the law would predict in the aggregate.  Standards of review are 
formal rules used by appellate courts to determine the degree of deference 
that they should give to lower court or executive agency judgments.104  
Judges regularly use these standards in cases and normally identify them in 
their opinions.105  Standards of review do not directly dictate the outcome in 
 
97  See Posner, supra note 91, at 1051.  
98  The attitudinal and strategic models are derived primarily from the works of Frank Cross.  See 
generally Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 
1457, 1461–90 (2003) (explaining the two models).  Cross also presents another theory of decisionmak-
ing, the litigant-driven theory, see id. at 1490, but the litigant-driven theory has not been widely studied, 
and evidence that litigants drive decisionmaking in the courts of appeals is quite thin, id. at 1514 (“The 
data do not provide strong support for the economic litigant-driven hypothesis regarding judicial deci-
sionmaking.”). 
99  Id. at 1461. 
100  See id. at 1482–83. 
101  Edwards & Livermore, supra note 9, at 1915. 
102  KLEIN, supra note 10, at 21. 
103  Cross, supra note 98, at 1467–71 (referring to the formal model as the “legal model”).  
104  Id. at 1502. 
105  Id.  
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a case.  Judges are free to reverse a district court judgment when using a de-
ferential standard and to affirm a district court using nondeferential review.  
In the context of past decisions, these standards could be used to predict 
when a judge was more or less likely to elevate his or her judgment above 
that of other constitutionally significant actors (in this case, federal district 
courts).  The measure of activism used herein identified judges who de-
ferred less regularly than might have been expected under a formal model 
of the law, given the standards of review involved. 
Existing empirical scholarship supports the notion that standards of re-
view have created meaningful differences in reversal rates of district court 
decisions.  Previous research at the federal appellate court level has relied 
primarily upon the United States Courts of Appeals Database (the Songer 
Database), which includes more than 18,000 opinions from 1925 to 1996.106  
A prior study by Frank Cross using the Songer Database—one unrelated to 
judicial activism—found that standards of review are correlated with a 
change in reversal rates.107  However, because the Songer Database only 
coded standards of review in cases involving executive-agency decisions 
(868 cases),108 until now it has remained unclear whether the results would 
extend to general application of such standards.   
The study presented in this Article used a new dataset, and there is a 
strong correlation between the level of deference in a standard of review 
and the rate of reversal.109  Figure 2 below illustrates the reversal rates with 
the three most commonly applied standards of review.  The only nondefe-
rential standard in Figure 2 is de novo review.  The other two standards af-
ford deference to the judgments of district courts.  If standards of review 
were functioning as expected, and not acting as mere window dressing on 
opinions, it would be expected that reversal rates when using nondeferential 
standards would be higher than reversal rates when using deferential stan-
dards.110  Indeed, the results described in Figure 2111 support that hypothesis. 
 
106  See KUERSTEN & SONGER, supra note 8, at 241. 
107  Cross, supra note 98, at 1502–03. 
108  Id.  
109  p < 0.001.  Conventionally, the p-value, which reflects the possibility that findings are the prod-
uct of mere chance, indicates a statistically significant relationship if it is less than 0.050.  See, e.g., Ed-
ward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility 
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 497–98 n.58 (2005).  The p-value here was based upon a chi-square 
analysis.  Chi-square with one degree of freedom was 360.5456.  
110  However, if there were perfect knowledge and rational decisionmaking among the litigants, at 
least in private actions, there would be no observable difference in reversal rates since the parties would 
appeal, rather than settle, only where there was an equal chance of affirmance and reversal.  See infra 
notes 190–96 and accompanying text.   
111  A previous version of this graph appeared in Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You 
Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 1133, 1161 (2010). 
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FIGURE 2: REVERSAL RATE BY STANDARD OF REVIEW  
(p < 0.001) 
 
Given the significant difference in reversal rates between the nondefe-
rential and deferential standards, there was good reason to think that study-
ing reversal rates of different judges using deferential standards would 
provide a way to capture the elusive baseline associated with judicial activ-
ism.  By focusing on the situations where a judge was expected to defer 
more frequently to other constitutional actors, a measure was created to de-
termine a judge’s relative activism level in the aggregate.  
However, such a measure by itself was incomplete.  After all, if ideol-
ogy is an important predictor of judicial decisionmaking, as previous stu-
dies have indicated,112 then merely counting instances when a particular 
judge failed to defer would be insufficient.  A reversal might only indicate 
an ideological disagreement with a lower court, not one based upon a 
judge’s activism.  If, for example, a very liberal federal appellate judge 
served in a circuit with very conservative district judges, the appellate judge 
would be expected to vote for reversal at a high rate relative to a similarly 
situated conservative judge, even using deferential standards of review.  If 
the same judge was moved to a circuit with very liberal district court 
judges, that judge would suddenly become “restrained” using a measure 
that only counts instances where a deferential standard was used.  This 
would create the illusion of judicial activism without any basis in fact. 
 
112  See CROSS, supra note 10, at 38; see also Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the 
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 890 
(2008) (reviewing CROSS, supra note 10) (“That ideology plays any role in judicial decision making is 
an important and substantive finding, even with the qualifying understanding that the effect is con-
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To address this problem, there was a need for a baseline that would 
remove cases decided only by ideology or other factors separate from the 
concept of activism.  Fortunately, in this instance, such a baseline was 
available: reversal rates in nondeferential (de novo) cases.  Thus, the raw 
measure of an “Activism Differential” for an individual judge adopted in 
this study was: 
Activism Differential = Reversal rate using deferential standards – Reversal 
rate using de novo standard 
By focusing on the difference between reversal rates,113 the measure ad-
dressed the problem created by a mismatch in ideology between the district 
court judge and the appellate court judge.  Since a circuit judge received 
cases with different standards of review from the same pool of district court 
judges, a mismatched ideology would have been expected to increase rever-
sal rates in cases using either deferential or nondeferential standards.  How-
ever, the difference between those reversal rates would reflect the trait 
underlying activism. 
C. Advantages of a Trait-Focused Measure 
The activism measure described above has many advantages over ex-
isting measures and addresses the concerns of many critics of empirical 
measures of judicial decisionmaking.  One of the most significant consider-
ations in measuring judicial activism has been not focusing on singular opi-
nions, but rather looking for a pattern among many judicial actions.114  
 
113  With respect to the Activism Differential used in this Article, the deferential standards were 
grouped together.  This was done for a few reasons.  First, although there were some minor differences 
between the reversal rates using such standards, the differences were small when compared to the gap 
between the deferential and nondeferential standards.  Second, as Judge Posner has remarked, the only 
meaningful distinction between standards of review is between deferential and nondeferential standards: 
We are not fetishistic about standards of appellate review.  We acknowledge that there are more 
verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review (plenary or de novo, clearly erroneous, abuse of 
discretion, substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, some evidence, reasonable basis, pre-
sumed correct, and maybe others) than there are distinctions actually capable of being drawn in the 
practice of appellate review.  But even if, as we have sometimes heretically suggested, there are 
operationally only two degrees of review, plenary (that is, no deference given to the tribunal being 
reviewed) and deferential, that distinction at least is a feasible, intelligible, and important one. 
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  Third, at least for the corre-
lations discussed herein, the distribution of the use of the various standards was not an important factor 
with the variables analyzed.  Because clear error and abuse of discretion accounted for 78% of the votes 
where a deferential standard was applied, those were the majority of the standards used among the vari-
ous judges in the sample.  Since those standards had similar reversal rates in the sample, they were 
grouped together in the statistical analysis. 
114  See Marshall, supra note 33, at 1221 (“As some might argue, one case alone does not make an 
activist court and more cases are needed to establish a pattern.”).  A significant question in measuring 
judicial activism is whether to use a singular indicator or multiple indicators of activism.  Lindquist and 
Cross recently made a persuasive case for using multiple measures in analyzing the Supreme Court: 
“Measuring judicial activism systematically across multiple cases and indicators would clearly represent 
a methodological advance over anecdotal discussion of individual cases or even over quantitative meas-
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Indeed, discussions of activism in particular decisions have been almost 
certain to devolve into political debates about the proper way to understand 
and interpret law and about which outcome was “right.”115  By looking at a 
large number of decisions of judges in different areas of law using an objec-
tive measure, pictures of judges’ respective activism propensities 
emerged.116  Because standards of review are commonplace, the measure 
used here allowed for adequate sample sizes and removed the focus from 
isolated judicial outcomes. 
Looking at patterns based upon large amounts of data also helped to 
address certain objections to quantitative analysis of judicial decisionmak-
ing.  Judge Harry Edwards, a noted critic of such analysis,117 has argued that 
“[r]egression analysis does not do well in capturing the nuances of human 
personalities and relationships, so empirical studies on judicial decision 
making that rely solely on this tool are inherently flawed.”118  Judge Ed-
wards recently offered a variation on this objection in an article co-authored 
with Michael Livermore.  Edwards and Livermore argued that scholars 
have failed to measure the intricacies of judicial decisionmaking because 
they lack access to the deliberative process.119  While this objection might 
carry substantial weight when analyzing small sample sizes, the greater the 
data pool, the more likely that the “nuances of human personalities and rela-
                                                                                                                           
ures that reflect only one dimension or characteristic behavior associated with the concept.”  Cross & 
Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1773.   
Nonetheless, the rationale for multiple indicators does not apply as forcefully, at least for the indica-
tors reviewed by Lindquist and Cross, to studies of federal appellate courts.  As a percentage of the fed-
eral litigation docket, courts of appeals only review constitutional challenges to a small number of 
federal laws, state laws, and executive actions.  See supra Figure 1.  The measure used in this study in-
cludes cases where the federal appellate court reviewed actions by other branches and sovereigns since 
those reviews almost always follow a district court decision.  Therefore, although a study with multiple 
indicators might generally be preferable, because this Article analyzes a large percentage of the federal 
appellate docket—including cases where alternate measures might apply—there is no strong rationale 
for using more than one measure.  Even if more dimensions were added to the Activism Scores, it is un-
clear how they should be weighted.  If each dimension were weighted by frequency, then the results 
herein would not differ much because of the rarity of interbranch review. If, however, interbranch re-
view were given a higher weight, it would render less valid the final scores because of the very small 
samples of interbranch review for each judge in the dataset.  
115  See Kerr, supra note 29, at 32. 
116  Cf. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 15, at 1773 (“[E]ven if it is difficult to argue that a specific 
decision is or is not activist, we believe that some systematic tendencies of activist decision making can 
be studied.”). 
117  See, e.g., Steven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: An Intro-
duction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2005).  
118  Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1639, 1656 (2003). 
119  Edwards & Livermore, supra note 9, at 1903 (“[T]he deliberative process pursuant to which case 
inputs are transformed into a judicial decision cannot be observed by outsiders; nor is there a transcript 
of judges’ deliberations leading to a decision.  As a result, scholars and other interested parties have no 
access to the actual process of appellate decisionmaking.”). 
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tionships”120 will surface in some measurable form (insofar as they affect 
the decisions of judges).  By looking at the full range of case types re-
viewed by the courts of appeals judges in 2008, this study diminished the 
force of Judge Edwards’s argument.  Further, by focusing on a standard of 
review, the measure used in this Article relied on part of the hidden deliber-
ative process as the judges reported it in their opinions. 
The singular examination of outcomes has also been the basis for sig-
nificant critique of empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking.121  Since 
the disposition alone gives almost no information about the underlying de-
cisionmaking of the judge, it is often a poor tool for understanding the 
process of judging.122  As a result, some scholars, such as Jack Knight, have 
called for an increased focus on the reasoning of judicial opinions when 
studying decisionmaking.123  This study partially answered that call by ap-
plying a measure based upon the standard of review portion of a judicial 
opinion. 
Robert Justin Lipkin has argued that it is impossible to measure judi-
cial activism without making normative judgments about the underlying ac-
tivity of the judge.124  Lipkin contends that because existing measures rely 
upon the underlying constitutionality of a particular law or action, any em-
pirical measure is inseparable from a normative valuation.  However, in this 
study, relying on an apolitical rule (a standard of review) and measuring in 
the aggregate ensured that the empirical measures did not succumb to this 
value judgment.  A reader of this study is free to regard any particular opi-
nion or judge as embodying or fulfilling the proper role of the judiciary.  
The scores in this study simply provide a measure of the judges in relation 
to one another.  The normative assessment of the ideal judge is left to each 
individual reader. 
 
120  Edwards, supra note 118, at 1656. 
121  See Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 
58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1532 (2009) (“[Professor Lee Epstein and I] argued that empirical studies of judicial 
decisionmaking had focused too narrowly on the disposition of the case, on the final vote on the me-
rits . . . .”). 
122  See id. at 1549 (“[A]nswering questions about the effects of X on either the substantive content 
of the law or on the justification of the decision involves an explicit analysis of the form and content of 
the judicial opinion.”). 
123  See id. at 1546 (“[S]ome empiricists have begun to push research in the direction of taking the 
substance of judicial opinion seriously.”).  
124  Lipkin, supra note 15, at 212 (“Indeed, any definition of judicial activism purporting to have re-
levance to constitutional discourse requires a normative argument.  A judge’s reason for striking down 
legislation or reversing a judicial precedent must be that the law or judicial precedent is unconstitutional; 
concluding that a judicial decision is unconstitutional is a normative conclusion.  Consequently, there is 
no escaping the normative dimension even in conducting empirical inquiries into judicial behavior.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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III. MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM THROUGH REVERSAL RATES WITH 
DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Applying the measure outlined above necessitated collection of a large 
amount of data.  Since activism is primarily about the activities of individu-
al judges (and not whole circuits), adequate sample sizes of opinions of 
judges on the U.S. courts of appeals were needed.  Further, because several 
of the correlative examinations described below ultimately relied on judges, 
rather than opinions, as the unit of measure, the study required a large num-
ber of judges, each with a sufficient sample size of opinions.   
A. Study Design and Methodology 
The author has used this dataset in another recent study,125 so the de-
scription of it here is limited.  Data were gathered from published and un-
published 2008 opinions issued by the First through Eleventh Circuits.  The 
analyzed dataset, the “Case Database,” from those circuits included 30,726 
judicial votes from panel decisions.  The Case Database included opinions 
that used a standard of review,126 excluding immigration127 and habeas cor-
pus128 cases, which contain unique standard of review issues.  Among other 
variables, cases were coded for: judges on the panel, whether individual 
judges were sitting by designation, appellate disposition, type of case (e.g., 
criminal or environmental), prevailing party, circuit, district court judge, 
district court, whether the case involved review of legislation for constitu-
tionality, whether the case involved review of an executive agency decision, 
and standard of review used.  In analyzing each case, the vote of each judge 
on the panel was coded separately, and thus a dissent by a judge in a case 
was coded as though that judge had controlling authority.  This allowed for 
each judge’s activism level to be determined independently, even when he 
or she dissented in a case. 
In addition to the Case Database, a “Judge Database” was constructed 
that included biographical and other data about individual judges.  In the 
Judge Database, judges were coded for, among other variables: appointing 
President, presidential party, American Bar Association rating, age at the 
 
125  See Yung, supra note 111.  
126  For each of the courts of appeals databases in LexisNexis, the following search was executed 
and all of the results were downloaded and coded: “date aft 1/1/2008 and date bef 1/1/2009 and (“De 
Novo” or Clear! Erro! or (Arbitrar! w/3 Capricious!) or (Abus! w/3 Discretion) or (“Substantial Evi-
dence” or “Standard of Review”)) and not immigration and not habeas.”  
127  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of 
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 474 (2006) (discussing how large portions of immigration 
case review—those by the Board of Immigration Appeals—are based upon a collateral review model, 
which affords a very high level of deference because “[t]he regulations . . . revise the standard of review 
to require greater deference to an immigration judge’s findings of fact”). 
128  See Brandon Scott, When Child Abuse Becomes Child Homicide: The Case of Gilson v. Sirmons, 
34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 281, 293–94, 305 (2009) (discussing the “unique” standard of review in fed-
eral habeas cases due to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act).  
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time of appointment, age in 2008, composition of the Senate at the time of 
appointment, gender, race, law school attended, prior work experience, 
whether the President and majority of the Senate were of the same party at 
the time of appointment, and whether the judge took senior status during or 
before 2008.  The Judge Database included data for all federal appellate 
judges that served on panels included in the Case Database. 
For each judge, a raw Activism Differential was computed based upon 
the formula described in Part II.B.  However, there were several adjust-
ments made to the raw Activism Differentials in order to allow for valid in-
tercircuit comparisons between judges and comparisons between circuits.  
The four types of alterations that were considered in determining the final 
“Activism Scores” addressed the case mixes of judges, panel effects, and 
circuit differences, and sought to provide a meaningful scale.129 
1. Case-Mix Adjustment.—The courts of appeals studied here re-
viewed different sets of cases from different sets of district judges based 
upon geography.130  As a result, there were important considerations in 
comparing results among the judges serving on those circuits.  In creating 
the Activism Scores, it was necessary to create an adjustment based on dif-
ferences in judges’ dockets in order to lessen the risk that there might be 
unobserved variables affecting the results.131  For example, compared with 
the other circuits studied, the Fourth Circuit judges had a very different ra-
tio of civil to criminal matters.  Individual judges in every circuit had civ-
il/criminal mixes with notable differences.  These variations were 
significant because there was a much higher rate of reversals in civil cases 
than in criminal cases, which would have an effect on the computation of 
the Activism Scores.  As a result, the Activism Scores for individual judges 
were determined by weighting a judge’s Activism Differential in criminal 
and civil matters based upon the overall distribution of criminal and civil 
cases.  Similarly, the reversal rates in the circuits studied were measured as 
“Adjusted Reversal Rates,” which were determined by weighting reversals 
in criminal and civil cases according to the average ratio in the dataset. 
2. Panel Effects Adjustment.—Prior research on the courts of appeals 
has identified “panel effects” that have challenged the assumption that 
 
129  For a detailed explanation of the calculations as applied to a specific judge (Diane Wood of the 
Seventh Circuit), see infra Appendix 1. 
130  With the exception of the Federal Circuit, which is not included in this study, the circuit courts 
have geographic and not subject-matter based jurisdiction.  Paul R. Michel, Foreword: Assuring Consis-
tency and Uniformity of Precedent and Legal Doctrine in the Areas of Subject Matter Jurisdiction En-
trusted Exclusively to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A View from the Top, 58 AM. 
U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2009).  
131  See David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selec-
tion, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415, 1433–34 (2005) (discussing, in the context of the Choi and Gulati 
study, the need to account for differences in circuit caseloads when creating empirical measures). 
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judges make their votes independently.132  Panel effects occur when the 
overall ideological makeup of a panel of appellate judges in some way de-
termines the individual votes of judges on those panels.  In this study, it was 
not immediately apparent why panel effects would be relevant to a measure 
which is primarily focused on votes to affirm or reverse district court judg-
ments.  However, a study related to this one found that differences between 
the ideological composition of the panel and the ideology of the district 
court judge alter appellate judge voting patterns in the aggregate.133  Fig-
ure 3134 below illustrates the differences in reversal rates for the three 
alignments described above.  
FIGURE 3: REVERSAL RATE BY APPOINTING PRESIDENT’S PARTY OF 
COPANELISTS AND DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
If a judge sat with two copanelists of the same political party as each 
other but of a different party than the district judge (based on appointing 
Presidents), then the studied judge was approximately 11% more likely to 
reverse the judgment of the district judge than in situations where the copa-
nelists were ideologically split or where the copanelists were of the same 
party as the district judge.  However, because Activism Scores are derived 
from differential reversal rates using deferential and nondeferential rather 
than total reversal rates, the panel effects adjustment made in the prior study 
was not directly applicable to the one in this Article.  Because the prior 
 
132  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–75 (1998); Ri-
chard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 
1751–56 (1997). 
133  See Yung, supra note 111, at 1166. 
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study was inconclusive as to whether panel effects disproportionately al-
tered reversal rates using deferential and nondeferential standards of review, 
no panel effects adjustment was made to the final Activism Scores here. 
3. Circuit Adjustment.—In addition to the case mixes discussed earli-
er, circuits confront varied substantive and procedural law and diverse cul-
tures and norms.  In light of these variables, and the possibility of numerous 
other unobserved variables that might account for at least some of the varia-
tion in the results, the computation of the Activism Scores included a circuit 
adjustment. 
The circuits are not wholly isolated from each other because many 
judges who take senior status then travel between them.135  These judges’ 
votes served as the basis for adjustments made to individual Activism 
Scores of the judges in all of the circuits.  It was assumed that a judge trav-
eling between circuits maintained her underlying activism trait and that any 
variations in that judge’s observed activism were best explained by factors 
unique to the different circuits on which she sat.  In this dataset, there were 
2472 votes by twenty-six judges that sat on panels in more than one cir-
cuit.136  In every instance where one of the twenty-six judges voted, his or 
her Activism Score was computed for the circuit in which the vote was reg-
istered.  The differences between the traveling judges’ Activism Scores and 
the broader Activism Scores in each circuit were used to determine the de-
gree to which each circuit changed the traveling judges’ activism levels.  
Although the differences in the effect of each circuit on the traveling judges 
were very slight, adjustments based on the changes in voting patterns of the 
traveling judges were made to the Activism Scores of every judge in the 
studied circuits.137 
4. Scaling Adjustment.—At the outset of this study, the raw Activism 
Differentials were not on a clear scale, and it was not obvious to potential 
readers what the high and low values in the dataset were.  Consequently, to 
offer greater clarity about each judge’s relative activism, the Activism Dif-
ferentials with the above-described adjustments were scaled to a range of 0 
 
135  See 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2006); Kelly Baker, Note, Senior Judges: Valuable Resources, Partisan 
Strategists, or Self-Interest Maximizers?, 16 J.L. & POL. 139, 150 (2000) (“Senior judges may travel 
among circuits and districts to provide services as necessary.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2000))).  
136  The traveling judges were Judges Arthur L. Alarcon, Ruggero J. Aldisert, Bobby R. Baldock, 
Clarence A. Beam, Pasco M. Bowman II, Myron H. Bright, Robert E. Cowen, Richard D. Cudahy, Da-
vid M. Ebel, Joseph J. Farris, William L. Garwood, John R. Gibson, Neil M. Gorsuch, David R. Hansen, 
Paul J. Kelly Jr., Robert B. King, Gilbert S. Merritt Jr., Roger J. Miner, Karen N. Moore, Jon O. New-
man, Jane R. Roth, Eugene E. Siler Jr., Walter K. Stapleton, Atsushi W. Tashima, John M. Walker Jr., 
and J. Clifford Wallace.  
137  The following adjustments were subtracted from the raw Activism Differentials for judges in 
each circuit: First Circuit, 0.00284167; Second Circuit, 0.002109021; Third Circuit, 0.002571733; 
Fourth Circuit, -0.001492098; Fifth Circuit, 0.000584711; Sixth Circuit, 0.001492867; Seventh Circuit, 
0.000660725; Eighth Circuit, -0.000983729; Ninth Circuit, -0.000192968; Tenth Circuit, -0.00230491; 
and Eleventh Circuit, -0.002069065. 
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to 100, creating the Activism Scores.  This was achieved by determining the 
highest and lowest Activism Differentials for judges with at least 200 inter-
actions with other judges—177 judges in total.  The judge with the highest 
score in that group was assigned an Activism Score of 100 and the judge 
with the lowest score was assigned a 0.  All other judges were scaled linear-
ly in relation to the high and low values.  The new value was the final Ac-
tivism Score.  For the regressions described below, the raw Activism 
Differential value was used to ensure that the process of scaling the scores 
from 0 to 100 did not create any statistical artifacts.  The Activism Score is 
used here to discuss the results because it more clearly communicates the 
scale involved and the differences between judges. 
B. Results and Discussion 
Several significant results related to judicial activism and reversal rates 
emerged from the data.  First, although the various courts of appeals re-
versed judgments of district courts at similar rates, the circuits exhibited 
very different levels of activism.  Second, the politics and identity of the 
President did not correlate with activism.  Third, even when the President 
and Senate were of the same party, there was no observed statistically sig-
nificant increase in activism.  Fourth, the ideology of individual judges, as 
measured by Common Space scores,138 did not correlate with judicial activ-
ism.  Each of these results is discussed below. 
While the dataset included data from over 1400 judges who served on 
the U.S. courts of appeals, sat by designation on those courts, or had their 
decisions reviewed by those courts, many of these judges issued votes in 
only a limited number of cases.  This was particularly true for judges who 
had taken senior status before or during 2008 as well as district court judges 
who sat on appellate panels by designation.139  Because the smaller sample 
sizes of votes for these judges might yield unacceptable error rates, the fol-
lowing analyses examined only the 177 judges who had at least 200 interac-
tions with other judges.140  Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of these 
Activism Scores.  
 
138  For a brief discussion of Common Space scores and their potential weaknesses as a measure, see 
Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 95–96 (2002). 
139  In all, the dataset included 2472 judicial votes by judges sitting by designation.  
140  The threshold was conservatively based upon the computation of standard error in the dataset.  
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FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVISM SCORES  
(AVERAGE = 50.2, STANDARD DEVIATION = 21.3) 
 
Notably, as indicated in Figure 4, the mean Activism Score was 50.2 and 
one standard deviation was 21.3 points.  The distribution, although largely 
normal, exhibited some small groupings of judges at both the high and low 
ends of the scale.  The Activism Scores of individual judges from the Se-
venth Circuit, as exhibited in Figure 5 below, illustrate the variation be-
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FIGURE 5: ACTIVISM SCORES OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDGES 
 
Other circuits had a similarly wide range of values.  The Appendices at the 
end of this Article include Activism Scores for all judges with at least 300 
interactions with other judges. 
1. Judicial Activism Between Circuits.—Within each circuit studied, 
total values were determined for the reversal rates141 and the Activism 
Scores in those circuits.142  The raw reversal rates were adjusted based on 
case mixes and panel effects in a manner identical to that used to create Ad-
justed Reversal Rates for individual judges.  A review of the data on a cir-
cuit-by-circuit basis revealed a remarkable trend.  The circuits showed 
relatively clustered overall Adjusted Reversal Rates, meaning that they 
treated judgments from the district courts in relatively similar manners.  
The Eighth Circuit was the least likely to reverse with an Adjusted Reversal 
Rate of 16.0%.  The Ninth Circuit was the most likely to reverse, with an 
Adjusted Reversal Rate of 26.1%.  As shown in Figure 6,143 the eleven cir-
cuits thus were grouped into a consistent and very narrow range of reversal 
rates, once they were adjusted for the criminal/civil case mix.  However, 
when standards of review were factored in to create the Activism Scores, 
the circuits diverged to a greater extent, as illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
141  For purposes of the study, reversals included all situations in which the judge sought to reverse 
any portion of the district court’s judgment. 
142  “Total values” refers to computations based on all of the votes by all of the judges in the circuit. 
143  A previous version of this figure appeared in Yung, supra note 111, at 1164. 
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FIGURE 6: ADJUSTED REVERSAL RATES BY CIRCUIT 
 
FIGURE 7: AVERAGE ACTIVISM SCORE BY CIRCUIT (p < 0.001) 
 
The variation in Activism Scores but not Adjusted Reversal Rates 
means that the judges on the studied circuits were behaving differently with 
both deferential and nondeferential standards of review.  If, for example, 
judges on a particular circuit had altered their behavior only in cases using a 
deferential standard, that would have affected the overall Adjusted Reversal 
Rate.  In order for the Adjusted Reversal Rates to be relatively consistent 
while the Activism Scores varied, the judges had to employ different ap-
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At the most activist end of the scale, the First Circuit had an Activism 
Score of 68.4.  The least activist circuit was the Fourth, which had an Activ-
ism Score of only 22.4.  Notably, even the limited variation in Adjusted 
Reversal Rates seems disconnected from any similar variation in Activism 
Scores.  The Eighth Circuit, for example, had by far the lowest Adjusted 
Reversal Rate, but exhibited an activism level above the mean with an Ac-
tivism Score of 57.0.  Further, linear regressions were performed for the 
Activism Scores and Adjusted Reversal Rates against the circuit number for 
the studied judges.  Whereas the circuit number had a statistically signifi-
cant correlation with the average Activism Score, no such relationship ex-
isted between the circuit number and the Adjusted Reversal Rate.  This 
provided further evidence that the variation in Activism Scores among the 
circuits was indicative of actual differences in the activism of the judges on 
those circuits and that that variation was not merely due to factors which 
would be expected to alter the reversal rates as well. 
2. The Appointing President and Judicial Activism.—As noted at the 
opening of this Article, the concept of judicial activism has become so poli-
ticized that it has become part of virtually every major discussion concern-
ing the judiciary and individual judges.  Among the various concerns about 
activism is whether individual Presidents or political parties have been re-
sponsible for appointing more activist judges to the U.S. courts of appeals.  
Traditionally, judges appointed by Democratic Presidents have been labeled 
as “activists” who push social agendas on an unwilling public.144  As noted 
earlier, however, increasingly there are attacks on Republican appointees 
for “right-wing judicial activism.”145 
The data did not support either hypothesis.  As demonstrated in Fig-
ure 8 below, for judges who issued opinions in 2008, the data did not indi-
cate that the appointing President had a statistically significant correlation 
with a judge’s activism.   
 
144  See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text. 
145  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 8: ACTIVISM SCORES BY APPOINTING PRESIDENT 
(p = 0.789) 
 
The Activism Scores of judges appointed by Presidents Carter, Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush (Bush I), Clinton, and George W. Bush (Bush II) varied 
by a mere 6.2 points, which linear regression determined was not statistical-
ly significant.146 
Looking solely at the political party of the appointing President also 
did not yield results that would support either hypothesis.  Figure 9 below 
illustrates that Republican and Democratic appointees had similar Activism 
Scores in the aggregate. 
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FIGURE 9: ACTIVISM SCORES BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT 
(p = 0.305) 
 
Overall, the appointees of Democratic Presidents exhibited a slightly higher 
average Activism Score (52.3 versus 48.9), but this difference was not sta-
tistically significant based on a linear regression of the Activism Scores and 
the political party of the appointing President.147  As a result, the study re-
sults provided neither a reason to believe that particular Presidents appoint 
more or less activist judges nor that the political party of the appointing 
President is related to the activism of judges. 
3. Unified Government and Judicial Activism.—One might contend 
that the limited difference in activism based on the appointing President’s 
party was due to an ideological split between the Senate and President dur-
ing the time period when most of the 2008 judges were appointed.148  As a 
corollary, one might expect a higher rate of activism among judges when 
the President and Senate were of the same party, since the President would 
be freer to appoint judges that would more actively support his ideology.  
Thus, the hypothesis would be that unity between the Senate and the Presi-
dent at the time of appointment would produce more activist judges.  How-
ever, as Figure 10 indicates, the data did not support this hypothesis. 
 
147  p = 0.305. 
148  John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process Un-
der Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 2 (2003) (“From 1969 through 
2002, the same political party had controlled the White House and both houses of Congress for only six 
out of twenty-four years.  The same party controlled both the Senate and the White House for only 
twelve of those twenty-four.  Although divided government has been the norm since World War II, uni-
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FIGURE 10: ACTIVISM SCORES BY UNIFIED SENATE AND PRESIDENT 
(p = 0.941) 
 
The data indicated that the party alignment of the Senate and President 
did not cause a substantial change in the activism of the appointed judge.  
Again, a linear regression found that the data did not support a statistically 
significant correlation between a judge’s activism and whether the President 
and Senate were from the same party at the time of confirmation.149  
4. Senate Composition and Activism.—It might also have been possi-
ble, even likely, that the President took into account the composition of the 
Senate before nominating a judge for the courts of appeals.  A President 
might therefore have nominated judges that were closer to the partisan ma-
keup of the Senate in order to ensure confirmation.  A hypothesis would 
thus contend that the political makeup of the Senate at the time of confirma-
tion would be correlated with the Activism Scores of nominees.  Figure 11 
below illustrates the distribution of Activism Scores based upon the number 
of Republican Senators at the time of the nomination.  
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FIGURE 11: ACTIVISM SCORES BY NUMBER OF REPUBLICAN SENATORS 
(p = 0.959) 
 
As is exhibited in Figure 11, there was no apparent connection between the 
composition of the Senate at the time of appointment and the judge’s activ-
ism.  A linear regression confirmed that the data did not exhibit a statistical-
ly significant correlation between the political composition of the Senate at 
the time of confirmation and a judge’s activism.150 
5. Ideology of Judge and Judicial Activism.—Unlike with Supreme 
Court Justices, there have been very few measures of the ideology of indi-
vidual judges on the courts of appeals.151  Nonetheless, existing research has 
indicated that ideology is a factor in predicting judicial outcomes at the fed-
eral level.152  The most basic measure for judicial ideology has been to use 
the party of the appointing President,153 which was reviewed in Part III.B.2.  
 
150  p = 0.959.  Because of the rarity of supermajorities in the Senate, no analysis was performed to 
determine if a filibuster-proof majority was correlated with activism of confirmed judges. 
151  See Fischman & Law, supra note 18, at 152 (noting that, for example, the one-dimensional mod-
el of ideology has been studied at the Supreme Court level but that “[v]ery little is known about the di-
mensionality of ideology on other courts”). 
152  See CROSS, supra note 10, at 18.  However, the effect of ideology is far less significant at the 
circuit court level than at the Supreme Court.  See id.  Furthermore, because of the limited research 
about the courts of appeals, there is still “great uncertainty” about the magnitude of the ideological effect 
at that level.  Id.  The Cross study using the Songer Database indicated that ideology did not “matter[] a 
great deal” in decisionmaking by courts of appeals judges.  Id. at 25.  Insofar as ideology might be an 
important variable in explaining the results in this study, the focus on the Activism Differential should 
have helped to account for mismatching ideology between federal appellate and trial courts. 
153  Fischman & Law, supra note 18, at 167–68 (“The enduring popularity of this measure most like-
ly derives from a combination of two factors.  First, the party affiliation of the President or other elected 
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A refinement on the appointing-President measure incorporated data about 
the Senators from the state of the nominated judge.  Lee Epstein, Andrew 
Martin, Jeffrey Segal, and Chad Westerland calculated, based upon the 
prior work of other scholars,154 “Common Space scores” for individual ac-
tive judges to measure their ideology.155  The Common Space scores 
mapped the ideology of judges on the courts of appeals on a continuum of 
the political spectrum instead of using the binary construction required 
when looking to the party of the appointing President.156  A hypothesis 
would posit that the ideology of the judge would correlate with activism.  
However, as Figure 12 illustrates, there was no obvious connection between 
judicial ideology as measured by Common Space scores and activism.  
FIGURE 12: ACTIVISM SCORES BY COMMON SPACE SCORES 
(p = 0.188) 
 
                                                                                                                           
the correlation between party of appointing official and judicial ideology has long been observed over a 
variety of courts, time periods, and issue areas: Democratic appointees are typically more liberal on a 
variety of issues than Republican appointees.”). 
154  See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ROLL CALL VOTING (1997) (measuring the ideology of senators based upon roll call votes); Micheal W. 
Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan 
Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 629–32 (2001) (applying the scores of senators with the party 
of the appointing President to create scores for individual judges).  
155  Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common 
Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007).  The scores were updated after publication of the article and 
are currently available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html. 
156  While Common Space scores might be an evolutionary improvement over party of the appoint-
ing President, there is reason to believe that such an improvement is nominal at best.  See Fischman & 
Law, supra note 18, at 196 (finding that Common Space scores offered only a modest improvement in 
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Regression analysis did not reveal a statistically significant relationship be-
tween Common Space scores and activism.157  Therefore, even when ideol-
ogy was computed using the leading measure of the concept, there was no 
observed connection between judicial ideology and activism. 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
Based upon the data, there is no measured support for the proposition 
that the President’s politics, the Senate’s politics, or the judge’s ideology 
have statistically significant effects on judges’ activism.  This runs contrary 
to partisans on different ends of the political spectrum who often have ac-
cused judges appointed by opposing Presidents of activism.  However, there 
are reasons to be cautious about such broad conclusions.  As with any em-
pirical study, it is helpful to examine reliability, validity, and potential limi-
tations of the data.  Each of those areas of concern is discussed below. 
A. Reliability 
Reliability is the degree to which the measurement would yield the 
same results when applied by others.158  Because this study is the first to 
systematically analyze judicial activism of judges serving on the courts of 
appeals, reliability cannot be determined by comparison to other empirical 
studies.  Instead, reliability is evaluated by the quality of the coding and 
analysis.  Since this is not the first study using this dataset,159 some of the 
discussion here is abbreviated. 
Case data were acquired from LexisNexis for each of the circuits stu-
died.  Some of the objective data (e.g., party names, citation, and opinion 
date) were harvested directly from downloads of cases using a proprietary 
computer software program.160  The remaining data were coded by law stu-
dents and a library research assistant.  Then a second coding of those va-
riables was performed on random samples of the data by persons other than 
those who did the original coding, yielding acceptable inter-coder reliability 
levels for the tested variables.  In addition, a variety of checks were per-
 
157  p = 0.188. 
158  Epstein & King, supra note 138, at 83 (“Reliability is the extent to which it is possible to repli-
cate a measurement, reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it is the right one) on the same 
standard for the same subject at the same time.”). 
159  See Yung, supra note 111.  
160  For examples of similar methods, see David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical 
Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the Inter-
national Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1711 (2009); and David L. Schwartz, 
Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 239 (2008). 
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formed to ensure internal consistency of variables that were necessarily in-
terconnected.161  
B. Validity 
Validity is the degree to which the measurement used in an empirical 
study reflects the concept measured.162  Assessing the study for validity is 
more complex than assessing it for reliability.  Generally, validity can be 
understood along a variety of axes.  For example, Professors Lee Epstein 
and Gary King, in their call for improved empirical legal scholarship, iden-
tified three possible ways to view validity: “facial validity, unbiasedness, 
and efficiency.”163  Establishing each of these categories is unnecessary,164 
but it is helpful to keep them all in mind in reviewing a study that tries to 
measure a complex and controversial concept like judicial activism.  Each 
of these categories is discussed below, but initially, it is important to return 
to the discussion of what exactly this study is measuring. 
1. Concept Measured.—The focus on review of district courts in this 
study may be a better measure in terms of validity than a focus on inter-
branch and intergovernmental relations.  These latter methodologies have 
inherent coding problems because a judge may have struck down legislation 
for a variety of reasons.165  To effectively capture the concept of activism 
using a measure that codes whether individual opinions are in fact activist, 
there must be a means of distinguishing such decisions from restraint.  If 
there is no objective, consistent method of coding, then the concept cannot 
be validly measured.  In contrast, standards of review were easy to code 
and, in the aggregate, provided a baseline that created a valid measure.  
A more nuanced, and potentially more problematic, version of this ob-
jection could be that this study does not measure the type of activism that is 
most important in our constitutional system.  The argument would contend 
that judicial activism is only important insofar as it implicates the democrat-
ic will of the population.  Since federal district judges, like federal appellate 
judges, are not elected, interactions between those bodies arguably would 
be less significant than greater questions of democracy. 
There are at least two reasons why this objection should not call into 
question this study’s validity.  First, the view that judicial activism must 
 
161  For example, the party labels in the coding include “criminal defendant.”  Such a party label 
precluded “civil plaintiff” and “civil defendant” from appearing in the outcome variable.  Many cross-
checks were employed to ensure quality and correct errors within the dataset. 
162  Epstein & King, supra note 138, at 87. 
163  Id. at 89. 
164  Id. (“[N]o one of these is always necessary, and together they are not always sufficient, even 
though together they are often helpful in understanding when a measure is more or less valid.”). 
165  Possible reasons include (1) unconstitutionality according to the consensus view of the legisla-
tion, see Green, supra note 20, at 1219; (2) pure judicial ideology; (3) strategic institutional maneuver-
ing, for example to increase reputation; or (4) some combination of the above factors.   
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diminish the will of the people would return the idea of activism to the 
wholly pejorative conception that scholars studying the term have re-
sisted.166  Depending upon an individual’s beliefs about the institutional role 
of the federal courts, the preference for restraint or activism may vary sub-
stantially.167  Constructing judicial activism in opposition to democracy 
would revive the pejorative aspects of the term that are in tension with any 
attempt to study the concept. 
Second, even if the objection was given its full weight, the study herein 
could serve as a proxy for measuring intergovernmental and interbranch ac-
tivism.  Because judicial activism is a trait that at its core involves the sub-
stitution of judgment, measuring a judge’s adherence to standards of review 
could predict a judge’s willingness to overrule democratic branches.168  
Notably, in the discussion of the four judges in Part IV.B.2, three of the 
judges (Posner, Easterbrook, and Wilkinson) have defended definitions of 
activism that limit the concept to intergovernmental and interbranch ac-
tions.169  Nonetheless, each of the three judges scored as expected while us-
ing the standard of review measure (which was not focused on interbranch 
and intergovernment actions).  Thus, even with the nuanced version of the 
objection, this study has offered a measure inextricably connected to judi-
cial activism regardless of how it has been defined. 
2. Facial Validity.—As Epstein and King noted, “A measure is fa-
cially valid if it is consistent with prior evidence, including all quantitative, 
qualitative, and even informal impressionistic evidence.”170  Because there 
has been no systematic quantitative evidence to evaluate this study, it was 
necessary to focus primarily on qualitative and impressionistic evidence.  
The dataset included four judges who had either written extensively 
about judging or whose judging style had been written about by numerous 
commentators: Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, Sonia Sotomayor, and 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III.  Because of the volume of scholarship about and by 
these four judges, the results of the measurement used in this Article can be 
evaluated in comparison to such scholarship.  The Activism Scores for 
these four appellate judges are listed in Figure 13, in addition to Activism 
Scores for other notable judges from most liberal (at the top) to most con-
servative (at the bottom).171 
 
166  See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
167  See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
168  Professor Kermit Roosevelt made a similar argument in the context of constitutional law.  See 
Roosevelt & Garnett, supra note 33, at 121 (Roosevelt, Closing Argument) (“The concept of deference 
is central to my analysis—the extent to which a Justice is deferential in different circumstances will tell 
us a lot about that Justice’s approach to constitutional decisions, and it might even help us in deciding 
whether the Justice is displaying an inconsistency suggestive of bad faith.”). 
169  See infra notes 172–82 and accompanying text. 
170  Epstein & King, supra note 138, at 89. 
171  The ideology scores in Figure 13 were determined in a related study.  Yung, supra note 111. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 42 
FIGURE 13: ACTIVISM SCORES OF NOTABLE JUDGES 
 
Judge Posner arguably has been the most prolific scholarly judge in the 
country.  Among his many writings are commentaries on judicial activism172 
and the process of judging.173  Consequently, he was an excellent candidate 
to use for purposes of testing validity.  As illustrated in Figure 13, among 
the 177 judges with adequate sample sizes, Judge Posner had an Activism 
Score (58.7), higher than the mean judge but within one standard deviation 
of the mean.  Based upon Judge Posner’s writings about how he has ap-
proached judging, his style might be crudely described as “If it’s broke, fix 
it.”  In other words, there are reasons to think that Judge Posner, under his 
model of pragmatist judging, would be less likely to defer to other constitu-
tionally significant actors on the basis of some formal rule.174  Thus, his Ac-
tivism Score being above the mean in this study appears appropriate. 
Justice Sotomayor’s judging style was thrust into the spotlight by her 
nomination to the Supreme Court.  As a result, there has been a wealth of 
writing about her “activism.”  Unfortunately, as noted at the outset of this 
Article, the partisan rhetoric has clouded whether she was truly an activist 
during her service on the Second Circuit.175  According to the data, then-
Judge Sotomayor was slightly below the mean based upon her Activism 
Score (44.3).  A few scholars and commentators engaged in some crude 
analyses of Judge Sotomayor’s activism that offered a test of validity for 
 
172  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983). 
173  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).  
174  See Posner, supra note 91, at 1053 (“Pragmatism includes formalism as a special case because 
when the conventional legal materials point strongly to a particular outcome (statutory text is clear, pre-
cedents numerous, recent, and ‘on point,’ etc.) there will usually be compelling pragmatic reasons to 
choose that outcome.”). 
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her score.  Based on those studies, there has been wide agreement that 
Judge Sotomayor appeared to be in the mainstream regarding judicial activ-
ism.176  Again, the results of the study here were consistent with the limited 
other data on the subject. 
Chief Judge Easterbrook, in his scholarly activities, has been a critic of 
judicial activism.177  In a speech he gave at a symposium on the subject, he 
attempted to find “value-free” meanings of “activism” and “restraint” be-
fore ultimately concluding that his definition described all of the Justices at 
the time as activist.178  Nonetheless, Chief Judge Easterbrook’s characteriza-
tion of the concepts indicated a hesitancy to put his judgment in place of 
certain other constitutionally significant actors.179  As Figure 13 indicates, 
Judge Easterbrook was more than one standard deviation below the mean 
judge with an Activism Score of 22.0, which was consistent with his stated 
views about judging. 
The last notable judge who has written about judicial activism is Judge 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III.  Of the four, Judge Wilkinson has been the most 
 
176  See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Is Sotomayor a Judicial Activist? New Studies May Shed Some Light, 
NAT’L L.J. (June 8, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp?id= 
1202431272514 (mentioning Lindquist and Cross’s work on Justice Sotomayor’s opinions and Cross’s 
impression that they “[did not] look activist”); Marcia Coyle, Sotomayor Is No Activist Judge, Says Au-
thor, NAT’L L.J. (June 8, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/ 
lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp?id=1202431275733 (quoting Stefanie Lindquist as describing Justice Soto-
mayor’s circuit court opinions as “unremarkable”); Daphne Eviatar, Another Study of Her Opinions 
Finds Sotomayor Is No Activist, WASH. INDEP. (June 26, 2009), http://washingtonindependent.com/ 
48772/sotomayor-congressional-research-service-report-ed-meese-gop-affirmative-action (“The Con-
gressional Research Service has issued a report analyzing the opinions of Judge Sonia Sotomayor and 
concluded, just as previous studies of her opinions have, that she is anything but a judicial activist.”); 
Savage, supra note 39 (noting that, according to traditional measurements of activism, Justice Soto-
mayor is a “mainstream jurist”); From Sotomayor Rulings, a Wealth of Data, N.Y. TIMES, THE CAUCUS 
(July 8, 2009, 6:09 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/from-sotomayor-rulings-a-
wealth-of-data/?scp=8&sq=judicial%20activism&st=cse (citing the Brennan Center for Justice’s exten-
sive study of the courts of appeals, which noted in a draft report that then-Judge Sotomayor had only a 
“slightly higher rate of striking down governmental actions” than her colleagues and that her colleagues 
nearly always agreed with her rulings).  
177  See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 1405, 1409–10.  
178  Id. at 1409–10 (“By my standard, all nine [Justices] are activist.  That all nine subscribe to in 
principle, and use in practice, the noxious canon of constitutional doubt is proof enough of this.  Each of 
the nine declared more federal statutes unconstitutional in each Term I examined than John Marshall did 
in a 34-year career.  And there does not appear to be any significant difference on the ‘activism’ scale 
between liberals and conservatives.”). 
179  See id. at 1403 (“[One] could vote ‘correctly’ for many reasons, not all of which are principled.  
Adherence to stare decisis is one.  Respect for democracy (coupled with the absence of any clause in the 
Constitution expressly authorizing judges to have the last word on constitutional meaning, plus the am-
biguity of many clauses) is another.  Intellectual modesty (often deserved) is a third, and timidity a 
fourth.  Yet a fifth reason is fear that ‘activist’ decisions will breed litigation, which the judge does not 
want to shoulder; laziness as a reason to deny justified claims of right is a shameful reason for decision, 
yet it produces ‘restraint.’  Still a sixth is Wexler’s conservation-of-judicial-capital approach, shared 
with Bickel and others, in which [the] judge picks favored rights and throws other litigants to the winds 
in order to fortify the Court’s status.”). 
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vocal critic of activism by judges.180  Most notably, after the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,181 Judge Wilkin-
son decried the decision as “represent[ing] a form of judicial activism” and 
called it “the worst of missed opportunities” to embrace a principle of judi-
cial restraint.182  The harsh words for the Court were significant because 
Judge Wilkinson’s political ideology seemingly matched the outcome in the 
case.  Nonetheless, Judge Wilkinson found the decision sorely lacking be-
cause the majority had failed to defer to another constitutionally significant 
actor, the government of the District of Columbia.  Consequently, Judge 
Wilkinson’s writings seemed to make him one of the most principled oppo-
nents of judicial activism among the judges in the dataset.  Of the 177 
judges with adequate population sizes, Judge Wilkinson had the second 
lowest Activism Score.  His Activism Score of 3.7, over two standard devi-
ations below the mean, was entirely consistent with his public positions 
about the proper behavior of judges. 
3. Unbiasedness.—The next Epstein and King validity test concerns 
bias: “A measurement procedure is unbiased if it produces measures that 
are right on average across repeated applications . . . .”183  Because this 
study relied on “revealed preferences” in the form of case outcomes com-
bined with a formal rule, the standard of review, the risk of bias in mea-
surement seems low.184  Moreover, this formal rule was almost never in 
dispute.  The standard of review was often briefed by both parties, and in a 
random sample of the briefs in one hundred cases in the Case Database, 
there were no instances where the parties disputed the applicable stan-
dard(s) of review.  The measure appears to avoid previously identified prob-
lems of biased coding of case outcomes based on political preferences of 
the judges.185 
 
180  See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 1398 (“Judicial activism can be heady wine.  The act of 
instructing coordinate branches on their constitutional obligations can become the all too exhilarating 
exercise of those who occupy the bench.  The abiding premise of America is democratic.  The limitation 
on the Court remains its lack of popular accountability.  Prior eras of judicial intervention into the affairs 
of the political branches have met with significant historical disfavor.”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The 
Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 791 (1989) (“A real danger of judicial activ-
ism is that these imperfect checks will be exercised more frequently, and that the constitutional position 
of the judiciary will be undermined.”). 
181  554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
182  J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 
253, 274, 322 (2009).  
183  Epstein & King, supra note 138, at 92 (emphasis omitted).  
184  See id. at 94 (“So, instead of (or sometimes in addition to) asking respondents to answer research 
questions directly, it is usually better to look for revealed preferences, which are consequences of theo-
ries of motive that are directly observable in real behavior.”). 
185  See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 9, at 1924–25 (“Some studies seek to code case outcome 
according to topical or political criteria. . . .  Perhaps the most common metric used in empirical studies 
is a simple ‘left/right’ or ‘liberal/conservative’ binary.  These topical or political measures used to de-
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4. Efficiency.—The last Epstein and King test for validity is efficien-
cy, which “helps us choose among several unbiased measures, with the ba-
sic idea being to choose the one with the minimum variance.”186  As noted 
earlier, the other measures that have been offered to measure activism by 
judges (based upon review of other branches or governments) have a high 
potential for variance because of the small populations of these types of 
cases presented in the federal appellate courts.187  While no study has ap-
plied those measures to the courts of appeals, it is likely that the measure 
applied here, based upon a standard of review, has reduced the potential for 
variance because of the large sample sizes, relatively noncontroversial cod-
ing, and adjusted homogeneity of the types of cases analyzed by judges. 
C. Limitations of the Data 
There are several limitations to the data utilized in this study.  Conse-
quently, as with any empirical study, it is important to articulate those limi-
tations so that only the proper inferences are drawn from the data.  Because 
this is only the second study using this newly created dataset, the need to 
carefully analyze the confines of the data is even more important.   
1. Time Limitations.—All the data studied in this Article were from 
2008 opinions.  This has several implications.  First, the judges studied 
might not have had the same activism levels over time.  Similarly, going 
forward, the judges may drift in their activism levels.188  Second, while the 
results reflected no statistically significant relationship between the appoint-
ing President and the activism of the appointees, that conclusion does not 
mean that there would have been no such relationship if all appointees of 
the studied Presidents had been examined.  Particularly for the Presidents 
that served decades ago, the remaining appointees who were still issuing 
opinions in 2008 may not be representative of the overall population of 
judges appointed by those Presidents. 
2. Data-Gathering Limitations.—The study also excluded opinions 
that did not use language relevant to a standard of review because of the 
way the LexisNexis searches were executed.189  That omission means that a 
portion of opinions by judges were not considered in this study.  If the sam-
ple used herein was a random sample of the overall opinion population, the 
omission would not be a statistical problem.  However, it is possible that, in 
the excluded cases, had the judges included a standard of review, there 
                                                                                                                           
scribe cases will necessarily simplify a court’s holding and reduce what may be a complex and nuanced 
decision into an often uninformative binary.” (footnote omitted)).  
186  Epstein & King, supra note 138, at 95. 
187  See supra Figure 1.  
188  See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift 
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) 
(finding that an ideological drift among Supreme Court Justices occurred over time).  
189  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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might have been different results that could have altered conclusions de-
rived from the data of this study.   
Another limitation of the data concerns the degree to which certain 
mixes of case types might distort the results.  The various regressions that 
were run controlled for the case mix between criminal and civil cases.  
However, it is possible that finer distinctions in the compositions of case-
loads per circuit and per judge could account for some of the variation in 
Activism Scores.  Without more data, it is impossible to assess the signifi-
cance of this limitation. 
3. Selection Effects.—As with any project that has studied a sample 
of court cases based upon the actions of third parties (i.e., litigants), there is 
a concern about selection effects.190  A selection effect is “a causal relation-
ship between the distribution of disputes and other variables of litigation.”191  
There were many points during litigation when a selection effect could have 
occurred for cases in the dataset, including pre-filing, pretrial, during trial, 
pre-verdict, postverdict, pre-appeal, during appeal, and postappeal.  If a se-
lection effect distorted the case mix in a way important to the study, it 
would call the study’s validity into question. 
Because this study was exclusively focused on the behavior of judges 
on the courts of appeals, the need to account for certain selection effects 
was limited.  Selection effects would only be significant for this study if 
they distorted the case mixes of individual judges or circuits relative to oth-
er judges or circuits.  Otherwise, as long as the selection effects were con-
sistent among the units of measure, they should not have implicated the 
validity of the Activism Scores. 
At the most basic level, selection effects rely on theoretical concep-
tions of the judicial process regarding the incentives of litigants.  Under the 
Priest–Klein hypothesis, one would expect appellate outcomes to split even-
ly (50%) between affirmances and reversals since the parties would settle as 
needed to avoid other outcomes.192  However, in the dataset in this study, 
and consistent with prior examinations of the Priest–Klein hypothesis, the 
results did not support the hypothesis in its broadest form since affirmances 
 
190  Several scholars have discussed selection effects.  E.g., Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Informa-
tion and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993); George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 271 (noting 
the centrality of selection effects in any conclusions one might draw). 
191  Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in 
the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 n.55 (1990). 
192  Priest & Klein, supra note 190, at 4–5.  A variety of studies have examined whether empirical 
evidence supports the Priest–Klein hypothesis.  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Ef-
fect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Randall S. 
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 590–91 (2001); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 
50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 222–26 (1995). 
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occur at a much higher rate than 50% regardless of the standard of review 
used.  Importantly, in criminal cases, the settlement structure (pleas) creates 
different incentives such that a 50% split was unlikely to occur.  However, 
even in the noncriminal cases within the sample, the affirmance rate was far 
higher than the expected equilibrium rate. 
The explanation for the difference between the observed rates and the 
Priest–Klein hypothesis also addresses the issues raised by selection effects 
more broadly.  In the appellate environment, in many instances, the margin-
al cost of an appeal is low compared to that of a trial.193  Further, there is 
typically significant uncertainty in predicting appellate outcomes.  Beyond 
the fact that the legal issues are usually close,194 the parties do not know 
which judges will sit on the panels until shortly before the oral argument.195  
By that time, the briefing has been completed,196 and any settlement is un-
realistic.  The data indicated that, looking solely at the effects of standards 
of review, the composition of the panel could have radically changed the 
predicted outcome.  Indeed, for example, in the Ninth Circuit, even exclud-
ing potential judges sitting by designation, one panel could be composed of 
judges with Activism Scores of 94.9, 92.4, and 91.4 or 35.1, 23.8, and 7.6.  
Consequently, the parties involved in the case would have had little infor-
mation to rely upon in predicting the outcome of the appeal based upon the 
standards of review applied.  The variation in judge activism observed in 
this study presents strong evidence that, because parties faced such great 
uncertainty in predicting appellate outcomes, certain types of selection ef-
fects should not have been problematic in many empirical studies. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial activism is a concept that has been used, abused, abandoned, 
studied, and debated.  It has become an important and permanent fixture in 
discussions about American judges and the judiciary.  To give greater cohe-
rence and cogency to future debates about such subjects, it is helpful to 
have empirical data about the concepts of judicial activism and restraint.  
Judicial activism is seen most clearly when judges elevate their own 
judgment over that of other constitutionally significant actors in circums-
tances where a formal model of law would predict otherwise.  This rubric 
 
193  See Meehan Rasch, Not Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in Determining Frivolous 
Appeals Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, 62 ARK. L. REV. 249, 264 (2009). 
194  Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
685, 748 (2009) (“As the authors acknowledge, the subset of cases that are actually appealed following 
trial are more likely to have ‘a degree of indeterminacy in the law.’” (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., 
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 16 n.20 (2006))). 
195  Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel 
Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 688 (2000) (“With one 
exception, the United States Courts of Appeals announce the composition of their panels only shortly 
before the oral argument, typically after all the briefs have been filed.”). 
196  See id.  
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for measurement incorporates the spectrum of actions that many have 
placed under the umbrella of judicial activism.  The empirical study herein 
expands the debate about judicial activism beyond the Supreme Court to the 
courts of appeals, which are the key determiners of most federal law in the 
modern judicial system.  The study also includes a new measure based upon 
adherence to standards of review that allows for the examination of larger 
amounts of data over a much broader selection of legal issues. 
The results of this study provide more evidence that the formal model 
of law explains many outcomes at the federal appellate level.  Furthermore, 
standards of review are important predictors of the final disposition of cases 
before the courts of appeals.  Notably, however, the various circuits that 
were studied demonstrated very different levels of adherence to such stan-
dards of review.  These various rates of adherence indicated measurably dif-
ferent activism among judges and circuits. 
Further, there is no evidence of any statistically significant connection 
between judicial activism and political party, which undermines the pejora-
tive use of the term “activism” that has been leveled at both parties.  The re-
sults indicated no such evidence of a relationship to the appointing 
President, the appointing President’s party, or the commonality of party be-
tween the President and the majority of the Senate.  The similarities be-
tween the activism levels of appointees from different Presidents and 
political parties poignantly illustrate the degree to which partisan attacks us-
ing the activist label are unsupported by the data that have been studied. 
There is still much work to be done in understanding judicial deci-
sionmaking, particularly at the federal appellate level.  The potential for 
measuring and understanding the federal judiciary has only begun to be 
tapped.  This Article has sought to expand the discussion about the types of 
measures and issues that can and should be examined. 
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APPENDIX 1 
An example applying the calculations performed in Part III.A.1–4:  
Judge Diane Wood 
To illustrate how the raw score was determined and subsequent ad-
justments were made, it is helpful to review an example set of calculations.  
While this section contains more computation than a math-averse person 
might like, I have attempted to make it as accessible as possible for even 
those with a limited background in mathematics.  
Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had a final 
Activism Score of 27.9.  It was determined as follows. 
The raw Activism Differential for a judge was computed with the fol-
lowing expression: 
Reversal rate using deferential standards – Reversal rate using de novo 
standard197 
Judge Wood reversed 4 cases out of 53 using a deferential standard and 13 
cases out of 49 using a de novo standard.  Thus her raw Activism Differen-
tial was (13/49) – (4/53), or 0.18983.  
The next step required a case-mix adjustment.198  Because criminal and 
civil cases have very different reversal rates, it was necessary to adjust 
Judge Wood’s score to account for the mix of civil and criminal cases she 
heard.  First, separate scores were computed for her criminal and civil cas-
es.  This was the expression used for criminal cases199: 
[(Avg. judge’s % criminal case affirmances (deferential) × Wood’s criminal 
case affirmances (deferential)) / (Avg. judge’s % criminal cases × Wood’s to-
tal votes (deferential))] – [(Avg. judge’s % criminal case affirmances (nonde-
ferential) × Wood’s criminal case affirmances (nondeferential)) / (Avg. 
judge’s % criminal cases (nondeferential) × Wood’s total votes (nondeferen-
tial)] 
Judge Wood’s criminal score was [(0.618481 × 4) / (0.584124 × 53)] – 
[(0.381519 × 13) / (0.415876 × 49), or -0.16348.  A similar expression was 
used to compute her civil case score: [(0.221077 × 4) / (0.209147 × 53)] – 
[(0.778923 × 13) / (0.790853 × 49)], or -0.18153.  Combining the two 
scores to provide a case-mix adjusted score was done using the average ra-
tios of criminal to civil cases among all judges, as illustrated in the follow-
ing expression: 
 
197  See supra Part II.B. 
198  See supra Part III.A.1. 
199 The method used in this Article extrapolated likely case and standard-of-review-type splits based 
upon the judges’ overall reversal rates.  This was done to ensure that sample-size effects for some judges 
(effects related to having too few cases of a particular type, such as civil cases with a deferential stan-
dard of review) would not distort the resultant scores. With more data, the ideal method would presuma-
bly be to use the judges’ actual case and standard mixes. 
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(Avg. judge’s % criminal cases × Wood’s criminal score) + (Avg. judge’s % 
civil cases × Wood’s civil score) 
Judge Wood’s adjusted total score was (0.44487 × -0.16348) + 
(0.55513 × -0.18153), or -0.17350.  
Because Judge Wood sits on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a 
circuit adjustment was made to her score based upon how the aggregate ac-
tivism behavior of her circuit differed from other circuits based upon the 
votes of traveling judges.200  In order to determine the value of the adjust-
ment, the case-mix-adjusted Activism Scores for the traveling judges in the 
circuit were aggregated based upon the number of votes they entered in the 
traveled-to circuit.  These aggregate scores were then compared with the 
scores they would be expected to have in other circuits as represented by 
their overall Activism Scores.  The difference between the actual and ex-
pected values indicated the degree to which a particular circuit differed in 
activism behavior.  The following expression was used for each circuit: 
(Scores of traveling judges in circuit – Expected scores of traveling judges) / 
(2 × Total number of judges in the circuit) 
In the Seventh Circuit, the adjustment figure was [(-0.10707) –  
(-0.12454)] / (2 × 16), or 0.00055.  Subtracting that figure from the case-
adjusted score yields a score of -0.17405. 
The last remaining adjustment was to scale the scores from 0 to 100 to 
clarify the relationships between judges’ Activism Scores.201  The lowest 
Activism Score of the 177 judges with at least 200 interactions was 
0.29977, which was added to each score.202  A multiplier (222.18168) was 
then applied so that the top score would be equal to 100.  In the case of 
Judge Wood, the final fully adjusted activism score was 27.9. 
 
200  See supra Part III.A.2. 
201  See supra Part III.A.4. 
202  Appendices 2 and 3 provide activism scores for judges with at least 300 interactions, a subset of 
the group of judges with at least 200 interactions. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Judge Activism Scores from highest to lowest for judges that had at least 300 
interactions with other judges203 
 





1 Smith, D. Brooks (375) 3 13.8% 100.0 
2 Ebel, David M. (381) 10 9.8% 95.2 
3 Gould, Ronald M. (329) 9 8.8% 94.9 
4 Rendell, Marjorie O. (336) 3 9.7% 92.8 
5 Thomas, Sidney R. (517) 9 9.3% 92.4 
6 Fletcher, Betty B. (389) 9 8.2% 91.4 
7 Martin, Boyce F., Jr. (339) 6 9.0% 91.4 
8 Tashima, Atsushi W. (417) 9 6.3% 87.9 
9 Sutton, Jeffrey S. (308) 6 4.8% 80.7 
10 Daughtrey, Martha C. (314) 6 3.3% 80.1 
11 Fuentes, Julio M. (363) 3 4.7% 79.0 
12 McKee, Theodore A. (336) 3 3.6% 78.9 
13 Evans, Terence T. (489) 7 3.1% 78.8 
14 Baldock, Bobby R. (336) 10 1.8% 77.3 
15 McKay, Monroe G. (318) 10 1.8% 77.0 
16 Torruella, Juan R. (343) 1 2.5% 77.0 
17 Murphy, Diana E. (699) 8 3.3% 76.4 
18 Wardlaw, Kim M. (387) 9 0.2% 75.1 
19 Shepherd, Bobby E. (618) 8 1.8% 74.3 
20 Gilman, Ronald L. (414) 6 0.6% 73.2 
21 Callahan, Consuelo M. (339) 9 0.4% 72.7 
22 Paez, Richard A. (416) 9 -1.2% 72.3 
23 Barry, Maryanne T. (386) 3 1.3% 72.2 
24 Melloy, Michael J. (453) 8 0.7% 72.2 
 
203  In a previous study using this same dataset, there were 143 judges listed as meeting the cutoff of 
300 judicial interactions.  See Yung, supra note 111, at 1205.  However, in this study only 142 judges 
had at least 300 interactions.  This discrepancy is due to the judicial votes of Judge Thomas G. Nelson of 
the Ninth Circuit mistakenly being assigned to Judge Dorothy W. Nelson of the Ninth Circuit.  That er-
ror has been corrected in the dataset, and the results in this Article are based upon that correction. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 52 
25 Canby, William C., Jr. (320) 9 0.4% 70.8 
26 Howard, Jeffrey R. (346) 1 -0.2% 70.4 
27 Tymkovich, Timothy M. (528) 10 -0.4% 70.0 
28 Cabranes, José A. (474) 2 -1.4% 68.1 
29 Benton, William D. (681) 8 -1.7% 67.2 
30 Holmes, Jerome A. (453) 10 -1.9% 66.8 
31 Black, Susan H. (1042) 11 -1.5% 66.6 
32 Wesley, Richard C. (424) 2 -1.9% 65.7 
33 Lipez, Kermit V. (311) 1 -2.8% 65.2 
34 Ikuta, Sandra S. (329) 9 -3.4% 65.0 
35 Sloviter, Dolores K. (360) 3 -2.4% 64.8 
36 Bybee, Jay S. (352) 9 -4.2% 63.9 
37 Lynch, Sandra L. (356) 1 -3.6% 63.8 
38 Pooler, Rosemary S. (357) 2 -3.4% 63.8 
39 Livingston, Debra A. (421) 2 -3.2% 62.9 
40 Jordan, Kent A. (461) 3 -3.1% 62.9 
41 Hardiman, Thomas M. (374) 3 -2.7% 62.8 
42 Bea, Carlos T. (356) 9 -4.0% 62.2 
43 Cole, R. Guy, Jr. (417) 6 -5.4% 59.8 
44 Jacobs, Dennis G. (336) 2 -4.2% 59.2 
45 Tjoflat, Gerald B. (883) 11 -4.9% 59.0 
46 Posner, Richard A. (384) 7 -5.2% 58.7 
47 Smith, Milan D., Jr. (333) 9 -7.4% 57.5 
48 Parker, Barrington D., Jr. (371) 2 -5.7% 57.0 
49 Elrod, Jennifer W. (534) 5 -5.8% 56.9 
50 Pryor, William H., Jr. (991) 11 -6.0% 56.7 
51 Kanne, Michael S. (420) 7 -7.1% 56.2 
52 Dubina, Joel F. (1020) 11 -6.6% 56.1 
53 Carnes, Edward E. (1028) 11 -6.3% 56.1 
54 Rogers, John M. (366) 6 -6.8% 56.0 
55 Silverman, Barry G. (338) 9 -7.0% 54.6 
56 Anderson, R. Lanier, III (1004) 11 -6.8% 54.6 
57 Chagares, Michael A. (375) 3 -7.1% 54.5 
58 Williams, Ann C. (384) 7 -8.0% 54.4 
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59 Jolly, E. Grady (693) 5 -7.6% 53.6 
60 Barkett, Rosemary (949) 11 -7.6% 53.3 
61 Lucero, Carlos F. (447) 10 -8.2% 52.6 
62 Ambro, Thomas L. (402) 3 -7.9% 52.5 
63 Loken, James B. (354) 8 -8.6% 51.9 
64 Hawkins, Michael D. (346) 9 -9.9% 51.6 
65 Clifton, Richard R. (304) 9 -9.2% 51.1 
66 Jones, Edith H. (438) 5 -9.4% 50.8 
67 Bauer, William J. (390) 7 -9.1% 50.7 
68 Wollman, Roger L. (686) 8 -8.8% 49.9 
69 Kravitch, Phyllis A. (382) 11 -9.3% 49.8 
70 Hall, Peter W. (443) 2 -9.9% 48.1 
71 Edmondson, J.L. (379) 11 -10.4% 48.1 
72 Clement, Edith B. (691) 5 -10.0% 47.8 
73 Gorsuch, Neil M. (438) 10 -10.8% 47.6 
74 Wilson, Charles R. (1112) 11 -10.4% 47.6 
75 Flaum, Joel M. (477) 7 -11.5% 46.2 
76 Hull, Frank M. (1052) 11 -11.3% 45.8 
77 Birch, Stanley F., Jr. (1004) 11 -11.5% 45.8 
78 Gruender, Raymond W. (602) 8 -11.0% 45.5 
79 
O’Scannlain, Diarmuid F. 
(417) 
9 -11.6% 45.2 
80 Griffin, Richard A. (421) 6 -11.0% 45.0 
81 Sotomayor, Sonia (360) 2 -12.0% 44.3 
82 Colloton, Steven M. (624) 8 -11.4% 44.0 
83 Fisher, D. Michael (462) 3 -11.9% 43.8 
84 Katzmann, Robert A. (351) 2 -12.0% 43.7 
85 Barksdale, Rhesa H. (675) 5 -11.9% 43.7 
86 Rovner, Ilana D. (426) 7 -13.3% 42.7 
87 Kelly, Paul J., Jr. (501) 10 -12.3% 42.3 
88 Marcus, Stanley (1028) 11 -12.9% 41.6 
89 Davis, W. Eugene (665) 5 -13.3% 41.2 
90 King, Carolyn D. (695) 5 -13.9% 40.8 
91 Prado, Edward C. (738) 5 -13.5% 40.8 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 54 
92 Duncan, Allyson K. (633) 4 -13.9% 40.7 
93 Wiener, Jacques L., Jr. (739) 5 -13.5% 40.4 
94 Riley, William J. (573) 8 -13.3% 40.2 
95 McKeague, David W. (386) 6 -13.8% 39.8 
96 Siler, Eugene E., Jr. (325) 6 -14.4% 39.4 
97 Bye, Kermit E. (576) 8 -14.3% 39.4 
98 Owen, Priscilla R. (662) 5 -13.6% 39.1 
99 Manion, Daniel A. (444) 7 -14.9% 38.8 
100 Graber, Susan (356) 9 -15.8% 38.8 
101 Benavides, Fortunato P. (720) 5 -14.2% 38.6 
102 Sack, Robert D. (377) 2 -14.1% 38.6 
103 Ripple, Kenneth F. (414) 7 -15.1% 38.4 
104 Fisher, Raymond C. (305) 9 -17.3% 37.7 
105 Wilkins, William W. (423) 4 -15.3% 37.4 
106 Raggi, Reena (446) 2 -14.4% 37.0 
107 Michael, M. Blane (647) 4 -15.4% 36.9 
108 Sykes, Diane S. (387) 7 -15.5% 36.3 
109 Higginbotham, Patrick E. (618) 5 -16.1% 35.8 
110 McConnell, Michael W. (453) 10 -17.1% 35.5 
111 Smith, Lavenski R. (635) 8 -15.6% 35.5 
112 McKeown, M. Margaret (351) 9 -15.7% 35.1 
113 Tacha, Deanell R. (390) 10 -16.8% 34.4 
114 Fay, Peter T. (408) 11 -16.9% 34.4 
115 Gibbons, Julia S. (368) 6 -16.4% 33.2 
116 Batchelder, Alice M. (308) 6 -17.5% 32.4 
117 Gibson, John R. (318) 8 -17.1% 30.5 
118 Roth, Jane R. (390) 3 -18.5% 29.9 
119 Gregory, Roger L. (665) 4 -18.4% 29.7 
120 King, Robert B. (735) 4 -19.1% 28.5 
121 O’Brien, Terrence L. (345) 10 -18.7% 28.3 
122 Wood, Diane P. (423) 7 -19.0% 27.9 
123 Moore, Karen N. (465) 6 -20.4% 27.9 
124 Garza, Emilio M. (672) 5 -18.8% 27.9 
125 Southwick, Leslie (657) 5 -19.2% 27.4 
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126 Stewart, Carl E. (758) 5 -19.2% 27.2 
127 Murphy, Michael R. (471) 10 -19.9% 27.1 
128 Haynes, Catharina (339) 5 -20.3% 25.5 
129 Clay, Eric L. (387) 6 -21.4% 25.0 
130 Traxler, William B., Jr. (714) 4 -20.9% 25.0 
131 Smith, Jerry E. (681) 5 -20.8% 23.3 
132 Easterbrook, Frank H. (366) 7 -22.1% 22.0 
133 Dennis, James L. (697) 5 -22.7% 20.2 
134 Anderson, Stephen H. (333) 10 -23.3% 17.8 
135 Briscoe, Mary B. (504) 10 -24.7% 17.2 
136 Motz, Diana G. (567) 4 -26.8% 12.2 
137 Niemeyer, Paul V. (674) 4 -27.5% 10.7 
138 Hamilton, Clyde H. (494) 4 -27.5% 10.1 
139 Reavley, Thomas M. (513) 5 -27.4% 8.8 
140 Hartz, Harris L. (456) 10 -29.1% 7.8 
141 Shedd, Dennis W. (631) 4 -30.2% 4.3 
142 Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III (474) 4 -30.6% 3.7 
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APPENDIX 3 
Judge Activism Scores by circuit for judges that had at least 300 interactions with 
other judges 
 
Judge (Total Interactions) Circuit Raw Activism 
Differential 
Activism Score 
Howard, Jeffrey R. (346) 1 -0.2% 70.4 
Lipez, Kermit V. (311) 1 -2.8% 65.2 
Lynch, Sandra L. (356) 1 -3.6% 63.8 
Torruella, Juan R. (343) 1 2.5% 77.0 
Cabranes, José A. (474) 2 -1.4% 68.1 
Hall, Peter W. (443) 2 -9.9% 48.1 
Jacobs, Dennis G. (336) 2 -4.2% 59.2 
Katzmann, Robert A. (351) 2 -12.0% 43.7 
Livingston, Debra A. (421) 2 -3.2% 62.9 
Parker, Barrington D., Jr. (371) 2 -5.7% 57.0 
Pooler, Rosemary S. (357) 2 -3.4% 63.8 
Raggi, Reena (446) 2 -14.4% 37.0 
Sack, Robert D. (377) 2 -14.1% 38.6 
Sotomayor, Sonia (360) 2 -12.0% 44.3 
Wesley, Richard C. (424) 2 -1.9% 65.7 
Ambro, Thomas L. (402) 3 -7.9% 52.5 
Barry, Maryanne T. (386) 3 1.3% 72.2 
Chagares, Michael A. (375) 3 -7.1% 54.5 
Fisher, D. Michael (462) 3 -11.9% 43.8 
Fuentes, Julio M. (363) 3 4.7% 79.0 
Hardiman, Thomas M. (374) 3 -2.7% 62.8 
Jordan, Kent A. (461) 3 -3.1% 62.9 
McKee, Theodore A. (336) 3 3.6% 78.9 
Rendell, Marjorie O. (336) 3 9.7% 92.8 
Roth, Jane R. (390) 3 -18.5% 29.9 
Sloviter, Dolores K. (360) 3 -2.4% 64.8 
Smith, D. Brooks (375) 3 13.8% 100.0 
Duncan, Allyson K. (633) 4 -13.9% 40.7 
Gregory, Roger L. (665) 4 -18.4% 29.7 
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Hamilton, Clyde H. (494) 4 -27.5% 10.1 
King, Robert B. (735) 4 -19.1% 28.5 
Michael, M. Blane (647) 4 -15.4% 36.9 
Motz, Diana G. (567) 4 -26.8% 12.2 
Niemeyer, Paul V. (674) 4 -27.5% 10.7 
Shedd, Dennis W. (631) 4 -30.2% 4.3 
Traxler, William B., Jr. (714) 4 -20.9% 25.0 
Wilkins, William W. (423) 4 -15.3% 37.4 
Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III (474) 4 -30.6% 3.7 
Barksdale, Rhesa H. (675) 5 -11.9% 43.7 
Benavides, Fortunato P. (720) 5 -14.2% 38.6 
Clement, Edith B. (691) 5 -10.0% 47.8 
Davis, W. Eugene (665) 5 -13.3% 41.2 
Dennis, James L. (697) 5 -22.7% 20.2 
Elrod, Jennifer W. (534) 5 -5.8% 56.9 
Garza, Emilio M. (672) 5 -18.8% 27.9 
Haynes, Catharina (339) 5 -20.3% 25.5 
Higginbotham, Patrick E. (618) 5 -16.1% 35.8 
Jolly, E. Grady (693) 5 -7.6% 53.6 
Jones, Edith H. (438) 5 -9.4% 50.8 
King, Carolyn D. (695) 5 -13.9% 40.8 
Owen, Priscilla R. (662) 5 -13.6% 39.1 
Prado, Edward C. (738) 5 -13.5% 40.8 
Reavley, Thomas M. (513) 5 -27.4% 8.8 
Smith, Jerry E. (681) 5 -20.8% 23.3 
Southwick, Leslie (657) 5 -19.2% 27.4 
Stewart, Carl E. (758) 5 -19.2% 27.2 
Wiener, Jacques L., Jr. (739) 5 -13.5% 40.4 
Batchelder, Alice M. (308) 6 -17.5% 32.4 
Clay, Eric L. (387) 6 -21.4% 25.0 
Cole, R. Guy, Jr. (417) 6 -5.4% 59.8 
Daughtrey, Martha C. (314) 6 3.3% 80.1 
Gibbons, Julia S. (368) 6 -16.4% 33.2 
Gilman, Ronald L. (414) 6 0.6% 73.2 
Griffin, Richard A. (421) 6 -11.0% 45.0 
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Martin, Boyce F., Jr. (339) 6 9.0% 91.4 
McKeague, David W. (386) 6 -13.8% 39.8 
Moore, Karen N. (465) 6 -20.4% 27.9 
Rogers, John M. (366) 6 -6.8% 56.0 
Siler, Eugene E., Jr. (325) 6 -14.4% 39.4 
Sutton, Jeffrey S. (308) 6 4.8% 80.7 
Bauer, William J. (390) 7 -9.1% 50.7 
Easterbrook, Frank H. (366) 7 -22.1% 22.0 
Evans, Terence T. (489) 7 3.1% 78.8 
Flaum, Joel M. (477) 7 -11.5% 46.2 
Kanne, Michael S. (420) 7 -7.1% 56.2 
Manion, Daniel A. (444) 7 -14.9% 38.8 
Posner, Richard A. (384) 7 -5.2% 58.7 
Ripple, Kenneth F. (414) 7 -15.1% 38.4 
Rovner, Ilana D. (426) 7 -13.3% 42.7 
Sykes, Diane S. (387) 7 -15.5% 36.3 
Williams, Ann C. (384) 7 -8.0% 54.4 
Wood, Diane P. (423) 7 -19.0% 27.9 
Benton, William D. (681) 8 -1.7% 67.2 
Bye, Kermit E. (576) 8 -14.3% 39.4 
Colloton, Steven M. (624) 8 -11.4% 44.0 
Gibson, John R. (318) 8 -17.1% 30.5 
Gruender, Raymond W. (602) 8 -11.0% 45.5 
Loken, James B. (354) 8 -8.6% 51.9 
Melloy, Michael J. (453) 8 0.7% 72.2 
Murphy, Diana E. (699) 8 3.3% 76.4 
Riley, William J. (573) 8 -13.3% 40.2 
Shepherd, Bobby E. (618) 8 1.8% 74.3 
Smith, Lavenski R. (635) 8 -15.6% 35.5 
Wollman, Roger L. (686) 8 -8.8% 49.9 
Bea, Carlos T. (356) 9 -4.0% 62.2 
Bybee, Jay S. (352) 9 -4.2% 63.9 
Callahan, Consuelo M. (339) 9 0.4% 72.7 
Canby, William C., Jr. (320) 9 0.4% 70.8 
Clifton, Richard R. (304) 9 -9.2% 51.1 
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Fisher, Raymond C. (305) 9 -17.3% 37.7 
Fletcher, Betty B. (389) 9 8.2% 91.4 
Gould, Ronald M. (329) 9 8.8% 94.9 
Graber, Susan (356) 9 -15.8% 38.8 
Hawkins, Michael D. (346) 9 -9.9% 51.6 
Ikuta, Sandra S. (329) 9 -3.4% 65.0 
McKeown, M. Margaret (351) 9 -15.7% 35.1 
O’Scannlain, Diarmuid F. (417) 9 -11.6% 45.2 
Paez, Richard A. (416) 9 -1.2% 72.3 
Silverman, Barry G. (338) 9 -7.0% 54.6 
Smith, Milan D., Jr. (333) 9 -7.4% 57.5 
Tashima, Atsushi W. (417) 9 6.3% 87.9 
Thomas, Sidney R. (517) 9 9.3% 92.4 
Wardlaw, Kim M. (387) 9 0.2% 75.1 
Anderson, Stephen H. (333) 10 -23.3% 17.8 
Baldock, Bobby R. (336) 10 1.8% 77.3 
Briscoe, Mary B. (504) 10 -24.7% 17.2 
Ebel, David M. (381) 10 9.8% 95.2 
Gorsuch, Neil M. (438) 10 -10.8% 47.6 
Hartz, Harris L. (456) 10 -29.1% 7.8 
Holmes, Jerome A. (453) 10 -1.9% 66.8 
Kelly, Paul J., Jr. (501) 10 -12.3% 42.3 
Lucero, Carlos F. (447) 10 -8.2% 52.6 
McConnell, Michael W. (453) 10 -17.1% 35.5 
McKay, Monroe G. (318) 10 1.8% 77.0 
Murphy, Michael R. (471) 10 -19.9% 27.1 
O’Brien, Terrence L. (345) 10 -18.7% 28.3 
Tacha, Deanell R. (390) 10 -16.8% 34.4 
Tymkovich, Timothy M. (528) 10 -0.4% 70.0 
Anderson, R. Lanier, III (1004) 11 -6.8% 54.6 
Barkett, Rosemary (949) 11 -7.6% 53.3 
Birch, Stanley F., Jr. (1004) 11 -11.5% 45.8 
Black, Susan H. (1042) 11 -1.5% 66.6 
Carnes, Edward E. (1028) 11 -6.3% 56.1 
Dubina, Joel F. (1020) 11 -6.6% 56.1 
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Edmondson, J.L. (379) 11 -10.4% 48.1 
Fay, Peter T. (408) 11 -16.9% 34.4 
Hull, Frank M. (1052) 11 -11.3% 45.8 
Kravitch, Phyllis A. (382) 11 -9.3% 49.8 
Marcus, Stanley (1028) 11 -12.9% 41.6 
Pryor, William H., Jr. (991) 11 -6.0% 56.7 
Tjoflat, Gerald B. (883) 11 -4.9% 59.0 
Wilson, Charles R. (1112) 11 -10.4% 47.6 
 
